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WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSLY
E. GREGORY WALLACE*
Religious ideas, symbols, and voices are woven extensively into the
tapestry of American public tradition. When the inclusion of religious
elements in public life is the result of government action, that tradi-
tion collides with constitutional doctrine. The most direct means of
inclusion is through various forms of official expression. Government
speaks religiously when it uses words or symbols to convey religious
ideas or sentiments, such as the delivery of a prayer at a public event
or the display of a religious symbol on public property.' This includes
not only official messages that carry overtly religious meanings but
also those that acknowledge or affirm the value of religion to society.
Such speech is restrained by the Establishment Clause, but drawing
the establishment line between permissible and impermissible messages
is enormously difficult. 2
Public culture and institutions are replete with "distinctively relig-
ious elements" 3 attributable to government expression. For example,
the pledge of allegiance to a nation "under God ' 4 and our national
* B.A., University of Arkansas; M.A., Dallas Theological Seminary; J.D., University of
Arkansas at Little Rock; LL.M., University of Virginia. Member, Arkansas bar. The author is
completing his S.J.D. dissertation on religious liberty at the University of Virginia School of
Law, and wishes to thank Price Marshall, John Norton Moore, Robert O'Neil, Bill Stunz, and
Stephanie Wallace for comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
I. "Government religious speech" and similar terms are used in this Article as shorthand
for the broad class of expressions undertaken or approved by the government that may violate
the Establishment Clause. Religious messages by private speakers may be attributed to the state
if the state exercises sufficient control over the origin or content of those messages. For example,
in Lee v. Weisman, school officials decided to include an invocation and benediction in the
graduation ceremony, selected a local clergyman to offer the prayers, and gave the clergyman
verbal and written guidelines for the content of the prayers. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-56 (1992).
2. By contrast, objective or descriptive speech about religion, such as teaching the history
of religion or studying the Bible as literature in public schools, does not implicate the Establish-
ment Clause. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (objective study of compar-
ative religion, history of religion, or the Bible for literary or historic qualities does not violate
First Amendment).
3. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1931). The Pledge of Allegiance was adopted in 1942 and amended in
1954 to include the phrase "under God." See H.R. REP. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339. The House Report states that "[t]he inclusion of God in
our pledge ... acknowledge[s] the dependence of our people and our Government upon the
moral directions of the Creator." Id. at 1, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2340.
1183
1184 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1183
motfo "In God we trust" 5 are religious affirmations. Federal law pro-
vides for observance of a "National Prayer Day." '6 Twice during the
past decade the significance of the Bible has been recognized by execu-
tive and congressional proclamations.7 Religious symbols are dis-
played on public property during holiday seasons, and religious art is
exhibited in public galleries. Government buildings are etched with
prayers and Bible verses, crosses are erected on public land, and relig-
ious texts or symbols appear on official seals and national monu-
ments." Our cities have religious names such as St. Louis, St. Paul, St.
Augustine, Corpus Christi, Zion, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
Legislatures, councils, and official events often open with prayer.
Chaplains are employed to serve our legislatures, armed forces, and
prisons. Speeches by great political leaders such as Abraham Lincoln
contain religious interpretations of national events. 9 The President is
sworn into office with his hand on the Bible and the final supplica-
tion, "So help me God." Even "Moses the Lawgiver" is displayed
above the Supreme Court's bench and court sessions are opened with
the cry, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court." As
the Court has noted with ample citation, "[o]ur history is replete with
official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance."'' 0
5. 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1956). For the legislative background of the Pledge of Allegiance and
the national motto, see ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 568-71 (1964) and Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
6. 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1988).
7. See Proclamation No. 6100, 55 Fed. Reg. 6783 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
A16-17 (proclaiming 1990 as the "International Year of Bible Reading"); S.J. Res. 164, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1838 (designating 1990 as "Interna-
tional Year of Bible Reading" and authorizing appropriate presidential proclamation); Procla-
mation No. 5018, 48 Fed. Reg. 5527 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. A12-13
(proclaiming 1983 as "Year of the Bible"); S.J. Res. 165, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A:.N. 1211 (authorizing the President to designate 1983 as national "Year of
the Bible").
8. For example, inscribed on the walls of the Jefferson Memorial is the vow Thomas Jef-
ferson made in 1800: "1 have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form
of tyranny over the mind of man." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept.
23, 1800), in 10 THE WRITINs oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 173, 175 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert
E. Bergh eds., 1903).
9. There are 14 references to God among the 699 words in Abraham Lincoln's Second
Inaugural Address, given March 4, 1865, which describes the horrors of slavery and the Civil
War from the perspective of God's providence and retribution. See Abraham Lincoln's Second
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in THE LIFE AND WRrrIGs OF ARAH.sm LINCOLN 839-42
(Philip Van Doren Stern ed., 1940). The Address is inscribed on the walls of the Lincoln Memo-
rial.
10. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984); see id. at 674 ("There is an unbroken
history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
Aermican life from at least 1789.")
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Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked, "We live by symbols, and
what shall be symbolized by any image of the sight depends upon the
mind of him who sees it."" To many, official texts, symbols, and
practices that convey religious meanings perform unique and signifi-
cant functions in our society. These symbols teach historical values
and traditions, provide a common sense of identity and social cohe-
sion, bring solemnity to public occasions, and remind us that there are
standards and values higher than those of the state. 2 To others, how-
ever, such public recognition of religion "stands as a dramatic re-
minder of their differences with [religious] faith."" That is why cases
involving government prayer or display of religious symbols typically
generate more public controversy than other Establishment Clause
disputes. Such cases usually pit those who believe that official affir-
mation or commemoration of America's religious heritage is both nec-
essary and desirable against those who view such practices as a vehicle
for injecting the majority's religion (usually Christianity) into public
life. 14
The Supreme Court is deeply divided over how to apply the Estab-
lishment Clause to government action that expresses or affirms relig-
ious sentiments. The most recent decisions, Lee v. Weisman" and
County of Allegheny v. ACLU,' 6 which involved graduation prayer
and holiday displays, generated a total of nine separate opinions re-
flecting at least four different positions. Separationists on the Court
generally consider official religious expression to be unconstitutional
unless the words or symbols used have largely lost their religious con-
tent over time.' 7 Justice O'Connor's so-called "endorsement test," on
the other hand, would permit religious speech that retains its religious
11. OLAIER W. HOLMES, John Marshall in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 270 (1920).
12. See AaiN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSE 83 (1990).
13. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics of Religion and the Symbols
of Government, 27 -- utv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 504-11 (1992) (describing how disputes over
government displays of religious symbols heighten religious divisions in local communities).
15. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding unconstitutional state-directed, participatory prayer at
public school graduation ceremony).
16. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (invalidating nativity scene displayed against backdrop of greenery
and poinsettias, but permitting menorah displayed alongside secular symbols of the holiday sea-
son).
17. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613-22 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 637-46 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). With the retirement of
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Justice Stevens is the remaining separationist voice on the
Court. Justice Souter also appears sympathetic to the separationist position. Both have consis-
tently voted for establishment claims in divided cases in recent years, except in Board of Educa-
tion v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), where Justice Stevens dissented alone.
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meaning or significance,"8 but only if the religious message, within its
larger context, is mitigated in favor of one that "sends a message of
pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs."' 9 The so-called
"coercion test" proposed by Justice Kennedy would allow the govern-
ment to speak religiously unless it directly or indirectly "coerce[s] any-
one to support or participate in any religion or its exercise," ' 20 or
unless "governmental exhortation to religiosity ... amounts in fact
to proselytizing." '2' Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist take a similar view, but would permit the government to
engage in nonsectarian religious expression so long as there is no di-
rect coercion, that is, coercion "by force of law and threat of pen-
alty.'' 2
2
An approach is needed that not only is faithful to the historic values
expressed in the Establishment Clause, but also accounts for the
unique difficulties related to official expression of religious sentiments
in a religiously pluralistic society where government shapes many of
the institutions of public culture. This Article suggests a proper Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence for government religious speech. I will
not deal with the related problems of restrictions on private religious
speech in public fora,23 the limits of government-subsidized private re-
ligious speech, 4 or the role religious sentiments may play in decision
18. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19. id.
20. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 660.
22. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681-85 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141
(1993) (denying church access to school facilities for viewing film on family and child-rearing
issues while generally opening schools for other community activities violates Free Speech
Clause); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (student religious groups may use
public school facilities for meetings under Equal Access Act without violating Establishment
Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university's refusal to permit student
religious clubs to use of meeting facilities when it has opened those facilities to other student
groups violates Free Speech Clause). Restrictions on private religious speakers in public fora
often are justified on the ground that it would be an establishment of religion for the govern-
ment to permit its property to be used for religious purposes. The Court suggested in Widmar
that the state's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause "may be characterized as
compelling," thus warranting forbidding or restricting what otherwise would be free speech. Id.
at 271. But the Court went on to hold in Widmar, as it also did in Mergens and Lamb's Chapel,
that permitting public property to be used for religious purposes under an open access policy
would not offend the Establishment Clause. The alternative approach proposed in this Article,
of course, would be applicable to that analysis, as well as to situations involving private religious
speakers on government property or at official events not considered a "public forum" under
Free Speech Clause doctrine.
24. See Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REv'. 405.
WHEN GO VERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSLY
making by public officials. 21 Furthermore, since the approach I pro-
pose is adapted to the unique difficulties posed by government relig-
ious speech, it will not necessarily apply in the same way to
Establishment Clause cases involving funding, regulation, or accom-
modation of religion.
My position is that government should not be required to act as if
God does not exist or religion is irrelevant to public life, but it may
not impose religion on anyone through official speech or symbols.
This means that the state may not tell people what they must believe
or practice in religious matters or take sides on theological questions
by suggesting that some beliefs are more or less true than others. It
also means that government may not speak in a manner that would
oblige anyone to engage in acts that would signify affirmation of re-
ligious belief or participation in religious exercise. In short, when gov-
ernment speaks religiously, it must not indoctrinate or coerce. No
doctrinal standard, of course, can provide a clear answer for every
difficult case or eliminate all line-drawing and close questions of judg-
ment. But perhaps the following analysis can get us beyond easily mis-
understood terms like "endorsement" and multipart tests that can be
manipulated to reach almost any result.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss why government religious speech
is analytically different from other forms of government support of
religion and therefore justifies a unique approach to assessing its con-
stitutionality. In Part II, I criticize the various tests the Supreme
Court has applied to government religious speech and suggest that the
Court has failed to formulate coherent standards for distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible religious messages. In Part III,
I examine this nation's colonial and founding periods for principles
that may suggest why certain forms of government religious speech
were not considered an "establishment" of religion. Finally, in Part
IV, I offer an alternative analytical approach that applies historic Es-
tablishment Clause values to official religious expression in a pluralis-
tic society.
I. THE MYTH OF "NEUTRALITY" IN GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Government speaks on a wide variety of subjects.26 Sometimes what
it says is unobjectionable; sometimes it engages in political advocacy
25. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORaLTrY
[N AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. Rav. 932 (1989); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105
HARv. L. REv. 2061 (1992) (book review); Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?,
27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075 (1986).
26. See generally MARK G. YrDoF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOV-
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on.highly controversial issues by disseminating official views or criti-
cizing opposing views.17 While there is no explicit First Amendment
restraint on government political speech, the Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly that the Free Speech Clause implicitly forbids the
state from compelling private citizens to espouse its political view-
points.28 Indeed, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,29 the celebrated flag salute case, Justice Jackson announced
sweeping protection for all "matters of opinion":
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us.
30
He acknowledged, however, that government officials could foster al-
legiance to the state "by persuasion and example."' 3' Thus, in the po-
litical context, while government may endorse ideas and persuade
ERNMNMT ExPREssioN IN AmmucA (1983); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Im-
plied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1104 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Is
Government Speech a Problem?, 35 SrAN. L. Rv. 373 (1983) (book review); Steven Shiffrin,
Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 565 (1980).
27. See, e.g., American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 134 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1312-14 (D.C. Cir.) (Scalia,
J.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). The First Amendment "does not mean that government
must be ideologically 'neutral,"' nor does it "silence government's affirmation of national val-
ues" or prevent the state from "add[ing] its own voice to the many that it must tolerate." LAUR-
ENCE H. TensE, AmEtic N CONSrrrtmoNAL LAW 588, 590 (1978). The decision in Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S 173 (1991), which upheld federal regulations denying funds to family planning
clinics that discuss abortion with their patients, demonstrates that government generally may
adopt a point of view on an issue of public concern and favor that view in the allocation of
public resources. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (public utilities commission could not order utility to place consumer group's newsletter
in utility's mailings to customers); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (citizen may not be
penalized for refusing to display "Live Free or Die" motto on license plate); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (state could not compel individual to pay dues to labor union
for use in political advocacy); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(state may not force newspapers to print candidates' replies to editorials); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school children may not be compelled to salute
flag and recite Pledge of Allegiance).
29. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Id. at 642.
31. Id. at 640. Similarly, while the official viewpoint expressed in the "Live Free or Die"
motto on state-issued automobile license plates was not "ideologically neutral," the state could
communicate it in noncoercive ways. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. See American Jewish Congress,
827 F.2d at 134 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("The government may encourage what it may not
compel. It may denounce what it may not forbid.") (citation omitted).
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others to adopt its views, it may not compel uniformity of opinion.32
Where religious speech is involved, government is limited by the Es-
tablishment Clause. The Establishment Clause operates together with
the Free Exercise Clause to safeguard religious decision making from
undue imposition or interference by the state. The former forbids the
state from imposing its religious preferences, while the latter forbids
the state from interfering with an individual's religious practices.
Thus, broadly speaking, the Establishment Clause makes explicit as to
religion (the right to refrain from practicing the state's religion) what
the Free Speech Clause leaves implicit as to opinion (the right to re-
frain from espousing the state's ideas). The analogy between the two
clauses is not perfect, however. While the state can advance certain
political views to the exclusion of others, it cannot endorse one relig-
ious view over another33 or prefer one religious group or sect over an-
other3 "[Tihe public right," James Madison observed, "[is] very
different in the two cases." 3 For government to take sides in sectarian
or denominational debates over theology would put "at grave risk
that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance
that religious faith is real, not imposed." '36 This means, for example,
that the Establishment Clause would bar a city from permanently
erecting a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall,3 7 while there
would be no similar prohibition on a year-round sign on city hall urg-
ing citizens to "Just Say 'No' to Drugs." The prohibition is grounded
32. It is difficult to know exactly what Justice Jackson meant by the ban against govern-
ment officials "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox." Some commentators have suggested that
this prohibition has never been taken literally because officials regularly endorse ideas or views.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 206-07
(1992) ('"Just say no to drugs,' 'End racism,' and 'Have babies, not abortions' are all messages
government is free to endorse under current law .... ") (footnote omitted); Shiffrin, supra note
26, at 568 ("When the ship to be steered is the public school, our fixed star is that officials high
and petty can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, and other matters of
opinion."). However, since Justice Jackson conceded that the government could advance its
views by "persuasion and example," he obviously meant to forbid something more than official
endorsement of certain viewpoints.
33. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) ("The law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma.").
34. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Establish-
ment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.").
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-100, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 3 LTTRS AND
OTaR W rrINGs OF JAMEs MDisoN 481, 482 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865). See Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657-58 (1992) (speech is best protected "by insuring its full expression
even when the government participates"; but religious freedom is best protected where govern-
ment is not a "prime participant" because it might "indoctrinate and coerce").
36. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
37. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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in the principle that government must remain "neutral" toward relig-
ion. Justice Clark wrote in School District v. Schempp38 that the ideal
of religious liberty is that all religious opinions and sects have "abso-
lute equality before the law" and that "government is neutral ...
while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.' 39 The
neutrality principle is the basis of both the so-called Lemon test4 and
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test for identifying Establishment
Clause violations. 41
The Establishment Clause has been interpreted to require not only
neutrality among religions, but also neutrality between religion and its
nonreligious alternatives.4 1 It is precisely at this point, however, that
the neutrality principle becomes problematic when applied to govern-
ment speech. Whenever the state communicates religious ideas or sen-
38. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
39. Id. at 215 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
40. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entan-
glement with religion."') (citations omitted).
41. The endorsement test forbids government endorsement or disapproval of religion. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in judgment) ("Government may not favor religious belief over disbelief."); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 644 (Brennan, J., concurring) (the Establishment Clause "require[s] neutrality, not just
among religions, but between religion and nonreligion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53
(1985) ("[TIhe First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.");
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can contstitu-
tionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion' . . . or impose require-
ments which aid all religions as against non-believers .... "); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (declaring that the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be a neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"). See also Douglas Laycock,
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAun. L. REv. 993,
1001 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion) (substantive neutrality means that
government must "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious
belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance").
Some have argued that the Establishment Clause does not require neutrality between religion
and nonreligion, but rather was meant to forbid only the "establishment of a national religion"
and "preference among religious sects or denominations." faffree, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See, e.g., ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW:
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987). This nonpreferentialist view, however,
has been largely refuted by the historical research of Thomas Curry and Douglas Laycock. See
generally THOMAS 1. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PAS-
SAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock,
Nonpreferential Aid). See also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667-71 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (rejecting the nonpreferentialist position).
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timents, it favors religion over nonreligion or irreligion. Indeed,
anytime government speaks or acts as if God exists, it endorses a relig-
ious claim. The only way to avoid this is for government never to'
speak religiously. Several commentators have urged that the Establish-
ment Clause be interpreted to require the elimination of all official
language or symbols supportive of religion. Kathleen Sullivan, for ex-
ample, argues that the Establishment Clause mandates an "official
agnosticism" requiring a "standing gag order on government's own
[religious] speech and symbolism. ' 43 In her view, the First Amend-
ment's negative bar against an establishment of religion was a political
compromise that ended religious division in the political sphere and
affirmatively "established" a liberal, secular public order where pub-
lic disputes may be resolved "only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." 44 "[T]he end of religious strife," she says, "requires not just
any Leviathan, but a fully agnostic one." 4 Her solution to the prob-
lem of government religious speech is simple: "Iblanish public spon-
sorship of religious symbols from the public square."
The argument is that the establishment of a secular state means that
government is constitutionally required to be impartial between relig-
ion and irreligion, but not between religion and secularism. Thus,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Allegheny, could assert
that "the Constitution mandates that the government remain secu-
lar," explaining that "[a] secular state ... is not the same as an athe-
istic or antireligious state. A secular state establishes neither atheism
nor religion as its official creed." ' 47 Government remains secular or
"neutral," so the argument goes, by speaking neither for nor against
religion. Secular speech is considered "neutral" speech, that is, it fa-
vors neither theism nor atheism and encourages neither belief nor dis-
belief. A complete ban on official religious speech or symbolism
therefore is not discrimination against religion, but "proper treat-
43. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 206.
44. Id. at 197.
45. Id. at 198 n.10.
46. Id. at 207. See also Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 379 (1992) ("[GJovernment cannot even persuade about religion, cannot
engage in religious observances, and cannot display religious symbols, even if it's not coercing
anybody(.]"); Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 42, at 920-22 (suggesting that govern-
ment-sponsored religious symbols or ceremonies are inherently preferential and coercive); Doug-
las Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1986) (arguing that the national motto "In God we
trust" and the names of cities such as Los Angeles and Corpus Christi are unconstitutional); Ira
C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN.
L. Rav. 739, 746 n.30 (1986) (urging the elimination of "all references to God in public life").
47. 492 U.S. at 610. See Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 42, at 1002 (as-
serting that for constitutional purposes, atheism is as much a religious belief as theism).
19941
1192 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 21:1183
ment"-because that is exactly what the establishment of a secular
public order entails. 41
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. There are at least three objec-
tions to the argument that this is what the Establishment Clause re-
quires. First, as a matter of history, the Establishment Clause was
never meant to create a purely secular state. 49 The founders clearly
rejected the idea that certain forms of government religious speech im-
permissibly involved the State in religious matters. I discuss this point
more fully in Part III of this Article. Second, the assumption that
government must remain "officially agnostic" to end political and so-
cial polarization along religious lines is both wishful thinking and
plainly wrong as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Third, the claim of neutrality is illusory because secular or nonreli-
gious speech is not always "neutral" toward religion.
In regard to the second objection, it is true, as Kenneth Karst has
emphasized, that controversies over the government's display of relig-
ious symbols can deeply divide local communities.0 The display of
religious symbols or other forms of official recognition of religion,
however, do not have to polarize communities. Part of the reason for
these controversies is the Supreme Court's own ambivalence toward
religious symbols and the confusion and misperception that its opi-
nions have engendered."I The potential for divisiveness could be sig-
nificantly reduced if the Court, in analyzing official pronouncements
and symbols that support religion, would formulate a more consistent
and accessible constitutional rationale that furthers the ideal of relig-
ious pluralism rather than majoritarianism or "agnosticism."
48. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 199.
49. See infra notes 276-306 and accompanying text.
50. See Karst, supra note 14, at 504-10. In our increasingly pluralistic society, religious
division or polarization includes not only disagreements among or within religious traditions, but
also between religious believers and those who claim no particular religious faith. Modern
church-state disputes tend to transcend the divisions among Protestant, Catholic, and Jew which
were significant in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, and instead pit religious
traditionalists against cultural progressives. See JMaEs D. HUNTER, CULTURE WAs: THE STRUG-
GLE To DEFINE AmERICA 67-132 (1991) (arguing that the politically consequential divisions are no
longer born out of theological disagreements between Protestants and Catholics or Christians
and Jews, but rather from more fundamental disagreements over the sources of moral authority
between "orthodox" and "progressive" factions within both religious and secular traditions);
id. at 131-32 (thus "progressively oriented Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and secularists share
more in common with each other culturally and politically than they do with the orthodox mem-
bers of their own faith tradition (and vice versa)").
51. Professor McConnell suggests that the Court's "no endorsement" approach "exacer-
bates religious division and discord by heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic inju-
ries." Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 115, 192
(1992).
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSLY
Of course, the Court's sometimes bewildering Establishment Clause
jurisprudence does not deserve all, or even most, of the blame for
local controversies over the public display of religious symbols. Pro-
fessor Karst rightly observes that these controversies often are rooted
in the struggle for dominance of one worldview over another . 2 His
contention that religious groups are primarily to blame for polarizing
communities during such controversies is sometimes true, but the po-
larization is often as much the result of those who oppose the public
display of religious symbols out of intolerance of religion or its public
expression. Religious strife will not disappear, however, just because
the government stops displaying religious symbols, fires its chaplains,
or removes "In God we trust" from its currency. Given the long-
standing nature of many of these practices, eliminating them com-
pletely would likely provoke even more division. We also must re-
member that the inevitable tendency to divide along religious lines is
precisely what James Madison understood as an extraconstitutional
guarantee of religious liberty. Madison believed that division and op-
position among multiple religious sects would make overbearing ma-
jorities unlikely.5 3 Besides, partisan controversy is common to the
political process for many issues, not just religious matters.14 Perhaps
this is why the Supreme Court has abandoned the political divisiveness
doctrine as a separate ground for holding governmental action involv-
ing religion unconstitutional."
52. See Karst, supra note 14, at 507-08.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A
religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety
of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger
from that source."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplic-
ity of sects."). See also WILtAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 112-13 (1985).
54. See Karst, supra note 14, at 506 ("[A]nother name for political controversy is demo-
cratic decision-making .... "); McConnell, supra note 24, at 413 (suggesting that religious dif-
ferences have never generated the civil discord seen in political conflicts over such issues as the
Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery).
55. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-56 (1992) ("Divisiveness, of course, can
attend any state decision respecting religions, and neither its existence nor its potential necessar-
ily invalidates the State's attempts to accommodate religion in all cases."); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) ("This Court has never held that political divisiveness alone can serve
to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct."); id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining
that while political divisiveness is "an evil addressed by the Establishment Clause," the ultimate
inquiry must always focus on "the character of the government activity that might cause such
divisiveness"). Professor McConnell observes that the political divisiveness doctrine was
particularly pernicious ... because it armed opponents of religious interests with an
invincible weapon: their mere opposition became a basis for a finding of unconstitu-
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The third objection questions the validity of the premise that secu-
lar speech is "neutral" speech. Some commentators have drawn a dis-
tinction between formal and substantive conceptions of neutrality.
Formal neutrality means the government must treat religion and its
alternatives on equal and nondiscriminatory terms, while substantive
neutrality requires the government to minimize its involvement in indi-
vidual decisions about religion.5 6 As a normative solution, the exclu-
sion of all religious ideas, symbols, and voices from the governmental
sphere would not be neutral in either sense. A "standing gag order"
on all government religious speech would privilege a secular view of
reality over a religious view of reality. In the modern regulatory state
with its ever-growing influence over personal behavior and public cul-
ture, this could have a significant effect on religious decision making.
Secular language is concerned with the natural and mundane. By
encompassing only that which is "this-worldly," it can convey the
idea that all knowledge and value is confined to the temporal-the
temporal is the only reality, or at least the only reality that counts.17
tionality. Of course, the political victories of either side in such controversies could be
divisive; but the doctrine did not-and could not-work both ways. In effect, the
doctrine blamed the religious side of any controversy for the controversy.
McConnell, supra note 5 I, at 130. For criticism of the political divisiveness doctrine, see Edward
M. Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in
Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980), and Michael E. Smith,
The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 83, 94-100.
56. See, e.g., Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 42, at 999-1001 (formal
neutrality means a ban on religious classifications; substantive neutrality means that government
must "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbe-
lief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance"); Michael D. Lieder, Religious Plu-
ralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 813, 867-77 (1987) (two subsets
of neutrality are equal treatment and strict separation); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neu-
trality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 83, 84-128 (1986) (establishment
neutrality contains two components: impartiality and noninvolvement). For more extensive dis-
cussions of the conceptual problems with "neutrality," see Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality
Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 146 (1986), and Steven D. Smith, Symbols,
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test,
86 MicH. L. REv. 266, 313-31 (1987).
57. Will Herberg describes secularism as "the creeping conviction that human life can be
lived and understood, in its own terms, without regard to any higher order of reality, that is,
without regard to God." Will Herberg, Modern Man in a Metaphysical Wasteland 5 INTERCOL-
LEGIATE REV. 79, 79 (1968-69). See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstruct-
ing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REv. 955, 1000 (1989) ("Secular beliefs, values,
practices, or facts are those that pertain to the affairs of this world or this life; they stand in
contrast to beliefs, values, practices, or facts that pertain to other worlds, other lives, or other
dimensions of reality."); see also Stanley lngber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compul-
sion of Public Schools, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 773, 781-83 (1993) (distinguishing between
irreligious secularism and nonreligious secularism).
Professor Smith correctly notes that the term "secular" should properly be understood inclu-
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There is no transcendent Deity in modern secularism, or if such a Be-
ing does exist, it remains unknown and unknowable, a Deus Abscon-
ditus which has no relevance to the here and now.5" In this way,
secular language may be indifferent, uncomprehending, or even hos-
tile toward religion. Sometimes this bias is subtle, as when public
schools neglect virtually any mention of how religion has influenced
history, science, philosophy, art, culture, and human behavior.5 9 But
secular language need not be openly antagonistic toward religion to
conflict with it; it need only affirm the contrary. For example, exhib-
its in the Smithsonian's National Museum of Natural History depict-
ing the origin of the universe and the beginning and development of
life on earth do not mention religion or contain any commentary that
is critical of religious views on the subject, yet they present a secular
perspective that is irreconcilable with the tenets of some religious
groups. 6° Both the agnostic and the atheist necessarily speak in secular
terms because the secular is the only reality they can affirm.6' To man-
date "official agnosticism," then, is not necessarily to mandate "offi-
cial neutrality" between theism and atheism. Of course, secular
language may not always affirm that which is antithetical to religion.
Secular and religious voices sometimes hold common positions on
sively to refer to the affairs of this world or life, rather than exclusively to mean "not religious."
See Smith, supra, at 999-1007. Most religions do not draw a sharp distinction between the sacred
and the secular. Rather, they teach that an integral part of true spirituality is to live uprightly
and show selfless concern for others in this life, especially to those who are poor, oppressed, or
suffering. Theistic faiths also hold that God is immanent in worldly affairs through his provi-
dential activity and in the lives of believers through his redemptive activity. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court generally has used the term in the exclusive, "not religious" sense in its Estab-
lishment Clause analyses, and that is the meaning I will use in the following discussion. See, e.g.,
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) ("pre-eminent purpose" of enactment must not be
"plainly religious in nature"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (a secular effect
is one that "neither advances nor inhibits religion"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
223-24 (1963) (setting "secular" purposes in opposition to "religious" purposes); id. at 276
(Brennan, J., concurring) (government is "secular, and not religious, in its purposes").
58. For a provocative discussion of how this affects the secularist's view of law, see Arthur
A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKcE L.J. 1229.
59. See generally O.L. DAvis, JR., ET AL., LooxniNG AT HIrSTORY: A REviaw oF MAJOR U.S.
HISTORY TEx'rooKs (1986); PAUL C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S
TaXTBOOKS (1986); Jill Rachlin, Putting God on the Reading List, U.S. NEws & WORLD RaP'T,
July 4, 1988. at 57; Barbara Vobejda, Why Censor Religion? Left and Right Agree It Belongs in
Textbooks, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1987, at DI. Fortunately, this trend may be changing. See
Janet Naylor, Religion to Enter Class as Culture, WASH. Timms, Sept. 24, 1991, at A10; Lisa W.
Foderaro, A Special Report: Hot Potatoes, N.Y. Tn.Is, Aug. 5, 1990 (Education Life Supple-
ment), at 23.
60. Claims that exhibits in the Museum of Natural History portraying the theory of evolu-
tion amount to an establishment of the religion of "Secular Humanism" were rejected in Crow-
ley v. Smithsonian Institute, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. The essential difference between the atheist and the agnostic is that the former denies
the existence of God, while the latter cannot affirm it.
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public matters for different, but not necessarily contrary, reasons. 62
But where these two perspectives collide, requiring the State to speak
only in terms of the secular is not neutral. 63
Two opinions by Justice Robert Jackson present the difficulty of
reconciling a regime of total secularism with neutrality in public edu-
cation.6 In his dissent in Everson v. Board of Education, 65 Justice
Jackson maintained that public education should be completely secu-
lar-"isolated from all religious teaching"-in order to maintain a
"strict and lofty neutrality" toward religion.6 Two years later, how-
ever, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,67 he had
second thoughts about this disjunction. The plaintiff in McCollum, an
avowed atheist, sought a court order not only ending the released time
program but also banning all teaching that suggested or recognized
the existence of a God.6 The concurring and dissenting opinions in
McCollum addressed the larger question of whether the State could
offer religious instruction in its schools, thus treating the case essen-
62. Prohibitions against murder and stealing are simple examples of public values shared by
both secular and religious traditions. For many Americans, the view that murder and stealing
should be illegal is rooted in their own religious beliefs, while laws against such are not them-
selves necessarily religious. That is why these laws can be held in common with people of no
faith. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (noting that laws proscribing mur-
der, adultery, and theft which exist for general welfare of society also agree with the dictates of
Judeo-Christian religion); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33 (10th Cir.) (up-
holding the construction next to a courthouse of a monolith bearing the Ten Commandments
because "the Decalogue is at once religious and secular"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
63. See John H. Mansfield, Comment on Holmes, "Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sover-
eignty and the Privatization of Religion," in RELIGIo , MORALITY, AND THE LAW 71, 74 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988) ("Religious answers have been privatized, but
not the questions to which they have been proposed. For those who think that heaven and earth
should be connected up in some way . . . the decision to base the state on secular values is
neither neutral nor indisputably correct.").
64. Public education is of special concern for several reasons. First, attendance is compul-
sory. Second, public education, as Donald Giannella has observed, "directly touches upon relig-
ious concerns, such as the meaning of existence and the sources and nature of human values."
Donald A. Giannella, Religious Iiberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part 11.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 561 (1968). Third, unlike the outside
world where students are exposed to other speakers besides the government, the state generally is
the sole authoritative voice in the public school. Fourth, younger children usually lack the
knowledge, maturity, and reasoning skills needed to evaluate critically what their teachers tell
them. Finally, students are rewarded or penalized based on how well they "learn" what they are
taught. See Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Ex-
pression and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REv. 863, 875 (1979).
65. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (narrowly upholding a New Jersey law providing for the transporta-
tion of pupils to both public and parochial schools).
66. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating an on-campus "released time" program of private
religious instruction in public schools).
68. Id. at 234.
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tially as one involving official religious speech. 9 In his concurrence,
Justice Jackson stressed that the Court "can at all times prohibit
teaching of creed and catechism and ceremonial and can forbid forth-
right proselyting in the schools," but expressed reservations about
whether it was possible, or even desirable, "completely to isolate and
cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably re-
gard as religious instruction." 70 Since "nearly everything in our cul-
ture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences," 7 1 he believed that complete secu-
larization of all academic instruction in public schools would distort
the educational process by leaving students ignorant of such matters,
even though the alternative was to expose students, albeit in a limited
sense, to the "inspirational appeal of religion. "72
Official silence about the religious dimensions of our history and
culture, however, is only part of the problem. When the state uses
secular language to convey ideas, values, or perceptions of reality that
are plainly at odds with deeply held religious beliefs, the effect on im-
pressionable children can be significant. That is why some religious
parents and children have objected to secular curriculum materials
they saw as actively indoctrinating against their religion.7 3
69. See, e.g., id. at 212 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Illinois has here authorized the
commingling of sectarian with secular instruction in the public schools."); id. at 245 (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (the question before the Court is "the constitutional limitation upon religious educa-
tion in public schools"). The majority viewed the case somewhat more narrowly, holding that
the program was "beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith," and thus prohibited by the
Establishment Clause as interpreted in Everson. Id. at 210.
70. Id. at 235 (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 236.
72. Id. Justice Jackson thought that subjects such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry
could be completely secularized, but "[m]usic without sacred music, architecture minus the ca-
thedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from
a secular point of view." Id. He believed, however, that "the inspirational appeal of religion in
these guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon." Id.
73. In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education the defendant school board stipu-
lated that certain passages in the required reading texts offended the plaintiffs' sincerely held
religious beliefs. 827 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit nevertheless rejected the
plaintiffs' free exercise claim on the ground that the mere "exposure" of the children to reli-
giously offensive ideas does not violate the Free Exercise Clause absent any "compulsion to
affirm or deny a religious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice forbidden or
required in the exercise of [the students'] religion." Id. at 1069. See Fleischfresser v. Directors of
Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994) (secondary or trivial religious references in supple-
mental reading program did not violate Religion Clauses, despite parents' claim that reading
materials indoctrinated children in values directly opposed to their religious beliefs); Smith v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (44 textbooks banned by trial court as
supporting religion of secular humanism did not convey governmental disapproval of theism);
Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.) (inclusion in school's curriculum of
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The clash of secular and religious voices is found not only in public
education, but also in a wide range of public policy issues relating to
the family, birth control, abortion, poverty, the environment, law and
justice, homosexuality, and euthanasia.74 To say that the state may
inculcate secular beliefs and values that are indifferent or contrary to
religion, and then to forbid any official recognition or affirmation of
religion, would put religious perspectives at a decided disadvantage in
the governmental sphere. Under the liberal regime proposed by Pro-
fessor Sullivan, however, this is exactly what should happen. Sullivan
concedes that secular dogma may look like a countervailing religious
faith to the serious religionist who disagrees with it. 7 She nevertheless
insists that it is not a "religion" for constitutional purposes, but
rather a "philosophy," comparable to the belief systems embodied in
the Republican Party platform, the American Civil Liberties Union
Policy Guide, and contemporary feminism.76 As such, secular ideol-
ogy may provide the substantive values of a liberal public order with-
out discriminating against religion or otherwise implicating the
Establishment Clause. 77 Despite the circular feel of Sullivan's argu-
ment, I agree that there are important constitutional differences be-
book containing supposedly anti-Christian statements did not violate Religion Clauses), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(distribution of condoms by public school to unemancipated minor students without opt-out
provision or prior consent of parents violates parents' constitutional due process and common
law rights, but program does not violate Free Exercise Clause even though it may influence
children to violate their religious beliefs). For a summary of various complaints from religious
parents and children about public school instruction, see George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and
Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 707, 708-
10 (1993). Dent concludes that "the teaching to which religious traditionalists object to is not
value neutral and often does not even try to be so." Id. at 710. See Ingbcr, supra note 57, at 779
n.37 (the realization that public education inevitably inculcates values "transforms public
schools into the stage for passionate struggles").
74. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DIsBELEF: How AmMcAN LAW
AND POLITIcs TRhvtALtzE RELIGIOUs DEVOTION (1993); HUNTER, supra note 50; Elizabeth Mensch
& Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. Rv. 923
(1991); Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 263
(1992); Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671 (1992);
Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113
(1991).
75. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 200; see id. at 199 ("The culture of liberal democracy may
well function as a belief system with substantive content, rather than a neutral and transcendent
arbiter among other belief systems."). Professor Stanley Fish maintains that liberalism has
a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over the community, the
cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the particular) that has managed, by the
very partisan means it claims to transcend, to grab the moral high ground, and to grab
it from a discourse-the discourse of religion-that had held it for centuries.
Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 1000.
76. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 200-01.
77. Id. at 201.
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tween secular and religious belief systems. 71 My point is not that
secularization of the public order is wrong because it amounts to an
establishment of secular "religion." Rather, it is wrong because it al-
lows the state to disregard or disparage religion, but not to speak fa-
vorably of it. This is not the kind of "neutrality" toward religion that
the Establishment Clause endorses. 79 To allow the state to express sec-
78. By failing to distinguish between beliefs and belief systems, Sullivan also overlooks the
possibility that certain beliefs within a system may be religious even though that system, on the
whole, is not considered a religion for constitutional purposes. For example, to illustrate how
liberalism may function as an ideology, Sullivan offers John Rawls' view that the liberal com-
mitment to religious toleration to end religious conflict was, as she describes it, "a substantive
recognition that there is more than one path to heaven and not so many as once thought to
hell." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 200 (citing John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consen-
sus, 7 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STosUDI 1 (1987)). However, if Rawls is correct, liberal democracy has
embraced what essentially is a religious belief in its commitment to religious toleration, namely,
that there is no exclusive way to heaven. It is disingenuous to say that a public philosophy based
on the idea that there is more than one way to heaven is "secular" and therefore acceptable in a
liberal democracy, but a public philosophy based on the idea that there is only one way to
heaven is "religious" and therefore unacceptable. Both positions derive from affirmations about
the traditional subject matter of religion and should not be distinguished for Establishment
Clause purposes. Of course, if the justification for tolerance that Rawls describes is embodied in
the Establishment Clause, then that clause expresses an essentially religious idea or position,
making it difficult to claim that the Establishment Clause forbids the state from engaging in
religious expression. Once Sullivan has opened the door to liberal democracy functioning as a
belief system with substantive content, rather than a neutral arbiter between competing concep-
tions of the good, her argument that the secularization of the public order does not discriminate
against religion unravels. The liberal state, as Professor Foley points out, "necessarily must re-
ject as erroneous any religion that contradicts the basic tenets of liberalism itself," thus discrimi-
nating against all religions that are inconsistent with the political doctrines liberalism espouses.
Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 963, 965-66 (1993) (summarizing the Rawlsian approach to church-state relations).
Moreover, even within the domain of those religions and other comprehensive philosophies that
are reasonable from the liberal perspective, see id. at 966-71, there is no internal requirement for
privileging secular ideologies over religious ideologies, or for privileging one religious ideology
over another.
79. Even though the Supreme Court has declared that the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from showing disapproval or hostility toward religion or from establishing a "relig-
ion of secularism," it has never invalidated government action on either ground. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the most "direct infringement"
of the Establishment Clause "is government endorsement or disapproval of religion"); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("[Tlhe State may not establish a 'religion of secu-
larism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."') (citation omitted); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961) (identifying "Secular Humanism" as a religion). In fact,
in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court used the Establishment Clause to strike
down an anti-evolution statute designed to eliminate religiously offensive teaching in public
schools. Efforts to portray the teaching of secular ideology in public schools as an establishment
of a religion of secular humanism have largely failed. See Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 655 F.
Supp. 939, 960-71, 980-83 (S.D. Ala.) (finding that public school curriculum was infused with
the tenets of the "religion" of secular humanism), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (1 th Cir. 1987).
I do not suggest that the Establishment Clause be used to invalidate official action simply
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ular ideas no matter how much they convey disapproval or hostility
toward religion, while at the same time forbidding any official expres-
sion that even marginally supports religion cannot be called even-
handed or nondiscriminatory.
It would be highly desirable if government's influence on religious
decision making could be diminished by stamping out every official
reference or symbol that is religious. This might be possible with a
minimalist government, where the risk that secular government speech
will distort religious choice is greatly reduced. The effect is different,
however, where the state controls many of the inculcative institutions
of public culture, such as education and social welfare, and frequently
speaks on matters that directly touch religious concerns. When it
speaks, government by its sheer size and sway will have a dispropor-
tionate influence on public perceptions. Excluding all religious words
and symbols from government speech could easily misdirect private
decision making in religious matters. For the state to speak only the
language of nonreligious viewpoints and ideals would make such posi-
tions familiar, easily understood, and believable. Total silence with
respect to religion, on the other hand, would marginalize or trivialize
religious views by making them seem irrelevant, outdated, or even
strange. This could easily misdirect private decision making in relig-
ious matters. As one writer explains,
[it is a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach
nothing about it. On the contrary you teach that it is to be omitted,
and that it is therefore a matter of secondary importance. And you
teach this not openly and explicitly, which would invite criticism; you
simply take it for granted and thereby insinuate it silently,
insidiously, and all but irresistibly.t 0
because it offends someone's religious sensibilities. Rather, my argument is that if the Establish-
ment Clause is interpreted to allow official indoctrination with ideas hostile to religion, it is not
neutral to construe it as prohibiting speech supportive of religion. The best solution to antireli-
gious elements in government speech is to allow a free exercise claim when enforced exposure to
offensive ideas conflicts with a specific religious duty to avoid exposure to such ideas, especially
in the public school setting. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058,
1075, 1078 (Boggs, J., concurring); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1541-42
(Canby, J., concurring). But see Dent, supra note 73 (arguing that a free exercise claim should
arise when students are merely exposed to ideas offensive to their religion).
80. WALTER MOBERLY, THE CRISIS IN THE UNIVERsIrY 56 (1949) (arguing that so-called reli-
giously "neutral" education "neither inculcates nor expressly repudiates belief in God ... [blut
it does what is far more deadly than open rejection; it ignores Him"). Similarly, Stephen Carter
warns:
[fon its stated zeal to cherish religious belief under the protective mantle of "neutral-
ity," liberalism is really derogating religious belief in favor of other, more "rational"
methods of understanding the world. The great risk lying a bit further down this path
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The consequences of a serious effort to eliminate all distinctively
religious language and symbols from the governmental sphere would
be substantial. The government would have to remove inscriptions
containing religious language from the walls of the Lincoln and Jef-
ferson memorials in Washington, D.C., change the names of streets,
cities, counties, and mountain ranges, expunge from public school
textbooks religious affirmations in the Declaration of Independence
and other public documents, recall and reissue our national currency
without the words "In God we trust," and raze the beautiful chapel at
the Naval Academy, to mention just a few examples. Given how
deeply such forms of official religious expression are ingrained in our
culture, their removal root and branch would send a forceful message
of hostility toward religion. The situation might be different if the
question was whether these practices should exist from the outset, but
that is not the world in which we live.
Professor Sullivan is comfortable with privileging secular ideologies
because she believes that certain "self-limiting features" will ensure
that "liberal democracy [will never] be a totalistic orthodoxy as
threatening as any papal edict."'" The most important feature she
identifies is the free speech guarantee that religious viewpoints may be
heard in public debate. This point is echoed by Professor Karst, who
reminds us that "a huge proportion of our public life-including ex-
pression in public and on matters of public interest-lies outside the
institutions of government.182 Elimination of all official sponsorship
of religious symbols still "would leave open a wide array of channels
is that religion, far from being cherished, will be diminished, and that religious belief
will ultimately become a kind of hobby: something so private that it is as irrelevant to
public life as the building of model airplanes.
Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 977, 978. See Gaffney, supra note 74, at 293 ("[Clomplete indifference to religion on the
part of government is just as lethal to religious freedom, especially in the affirmative welfare
state .... [Mlere formal neutrality toward religion turns out to be another form of hostility.").
Professor McConnell argues that in a pluralistic society, where government is a significant
participant in the formation of public culture, the best understanding of neutrality is one that
allows government speech to reflect the mixture of religious and nonreligious perspectives in the
private sector. In this way, the influence and effect of government speech on individual religious
decision making would be minimal, because the public would be presented with the same variety
of perspectives if government were absent from the cultural sphere. See McConnell, supra note
51, at 193-94.
81. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 201.
82. Karst, supra note 14, at 527. See Oliver S. Thomas, Comments on Papers by Milner
Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. E~incs & PUB. POL'y 451, 451-52 (1990)
("[The] public square . . . is not only well clothed in the garb of religion but perhaps a bit
overdressed. ").
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for public religious expression, including the messages of religious
-,rc.1e,'-Agsr. -A rcligion-based politics.-
It is true that the consequences of secularizing all official expression
could be mitigated by the presence of private religious speakers in the
public square.4 Fortunately, religious messages do not require the aid
of government to get across to the public. It is indeed ironic that some
who protest the loudest the removal of a nativity scene from city hall
never display such scenes on their own front lawns or church grounds.
One wonders whether they see the government creche as a substitute
for other ways of delivering the religious message of Christmas to the
public. From a constitutional standpoint, however, all of this is be-
sides the point. The meaning of the Establishment Clause is not deter-
mined by the number or persuasiveness of other religious voices in the
public square. That ample opportunities exist for public expression by
private speakers does not make government action itself any more
neutral or less discriminatory. Surely, no one would argue that the
creche in Allegheny was any less an establishment of religion because
of the availability of alternative channels for public secular expres-
sion.
The solution to the very real problems posed by government relig-
ious speech is not to eliminate all religious references from the govern-
mental sphere under some ersatz banner of neutrality or a secular
public order. Instead, we must look to other principles and values em-
bodied in the Religion Clauses to define the limits of official religious
expression. As Justice Goldberg warned in his concurring opinion in
Schempp, "untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead
to. . .a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive,
or even active, hostility to the religious," which he said is "not only
not compelled by the Constitution, but ... [is] prohibited by it." 5
II. GOVERNMENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN MODERN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
No member of the Supreme Court has advocated eliminating all re-
ligious rhetoric, symbols, and other religious references from govern-
83. Karst, supra note 14, at 528.
84. Contrary to those who would exclude religiously-based arguments from public dis-
course, neither the government nor private secular speakers should be the only voices in public
life. See generally CARTER, supra note 74; Levinson, supra note 25.
85. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see id.
("Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast
portion of our people believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and
personal values derive historically from religious teachings.").
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ment speech. Justice Brennan came close,6 but even he warned that
the elimination of all official religious references would exhibit "a
stilted indifference to the religious life of [our] people." '8 7 It is unlikely
that the Establishment Clause will be interpreted to prohibit religious
allusions in presidential speeches or to require removal of the phrase
"under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance. References to God in-
scribed on the walls of the Lincoln and Jefferson memorials in Wash-
ington, D.C. or the display of religious art in the National Gallery
almost assuredly will survive any Establishment Clause test. Despite
doctrinal disagreements over the proper approach to deciding Estab-
lishment Clause cases, there is a consensus among the Justices that
such practices should remain untouched. What they cannot agree
upon is why. 8
The modern era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence began with
Everson v. Board of Education,89 which interpreted the Establishment
Clause as forbidding government from "pass[ing] laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."' 9 Be-
fore Everson almost no one thought of the United States as a purely
secular state. For instance, in its 1892 decision Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States,91 the Supreme Court recited several examples
of religious language in official documents to support its declaration
that "this is a Christian nation." 92 This idea was restated in more
demographical terms almost forty years later in United States v. Mac-
intosh,93 which affirmed that "[wle are a Christian people... accord-
ing to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and
86. Justice Brennan left little room for religious utterances that still retained any significant
religious meaning, See infra text accompanying notes 157-69. Justice Blackmun's previously
quoted assertion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, that the Constitution mandates a secular
state could also be interpreted to require elimination of all official religious references. See supra
text accompanying note 47.
87. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. These practices typically have defined the outer limits of the Establishment Clause in
cases involving government religious speech in a way similar to the provision of police and fire
protection for churches in cases involving governmental aid to religion. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
89. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
90. Id. at 15; see id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (purpose of the Establishment
Clause "was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for relig-
ion").
91. 143 U.S. 457, 465-71 (1892).
92. Id. at 471. Nearly a century later, when the Court upheld the display of a nativity scene
in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Brennan chided the majority for taking "a long step backwards"
to the time when the Court "arrogantly declare[id" in Holy Trinity that "this is a Christian
nation." 465 U.S. 668, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
1994l 1203
1204 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1183
acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of
_'ou Even after Everson we find the often-quoted observation in
Zorach v. Clauson95 that "[w]e are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being." 96 In Zorach the Court suggested
in dicta that extreme separation of church and state would mean that
legislative prayers, religious appeals in presidential messages, court-
room oaths, Thanksgiving proclamations, and "all other references to
the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our cere-
monies would be flouting the First Amendment. '97
The controversy over government religious speech reached the Su-
preme Court for the first time in the school prayer and Bible reading
cases of the early-1960s. 98 Since then, the Court has revisited the issue
in cases involving posting of the Ten Commandments in a public
school classroom, 99 legislative chaplains and prayers, m the display of
nativity scenes or menorahs during holiday seasons, 0' teaching crea-
tionism in public school classrooms, 02 and, most recently, prayer at
public school graduation ceremonies. 03 The curious and sometimes
94. Id. at 625.
95. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding an off-campus "released time" program of private re-
ligious instruction for public school children).
96. Id. at 313.
97. Id. ("A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which
the Court opens each session: 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court."'): See
also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 253-55 (1948) (Reed, J., dissent-
ing) (legislative and military chaplains, prayer and Bible reading in District of Columbia public
schools, and compulsory chapel attendance at West Point and the Naval Academy are inconsis-
tent with the "no aid" mandate of Everson).
98. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer and Bible reading); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer). The rights implicated in the flag salute case, West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), were strikingly similar to those in the
school prayer and Bible reading cases, but Barnette involved the imposition of political ortho-
doxy which was objected to on religious grounds.
99. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
100. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
101. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
102. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
103. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Weisman is not the last word on the matter.
Several cases involving graduation prayers have been decided since Weisman. See Friedmann v.
Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (taxpayer did not have standing to
enjoin school districts from permitting students to read invocation or benediction at graduation
ceremony); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (school policy
allowing student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation at graduation
does not violate Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Gearon v. Loudoun
County Sch. Bd., 844 F.Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993) (student-initiated, student-written, and stu-
dent-delivered graduation prayers violate Establishment Clause); Shumway v. Albany County
Sch. Dist. No. I Bd. of Educ., 826 F.Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993) (school district enjoined from
refusing to rent gymnasium for private baccalaureate services); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No.
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disparate results in these cases can be traced largely to the Court's
continued insistence upon governmental neutrality between religion
and nonreligion while at the same time allowing for the permanency
of at least some forms of official religious expression. The Court has
yet to formulate a conceptual test for deciding Establishment Clause
cases that satisfactorily reconciles the two. At least five distinct ap-
proaches have been used, but none has provided a coherent way to
distinguish impermissible symbols or utterances from such widely ac-
cepted, "intuitively constitutional' °4 practices as placing "In God we
trust" on our money or opening court sessions with "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court."
A. The Purpose and Effect Test
Ten years after Zorach, the Supreme Court in Engle v. Vitale'05 in-
validated the so-called Regents' Prayer in the New York public school
241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993) (allowing high school students to decide whether to in-
clude prayer in their graduation ceremonies does not offend Establishment Clause). Lower
courts also have decided a number of cases since Weisman involving Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to other forms of official religious expression. See Gonzales v. North Township of Lake
County, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993) (display of crucifix in public park violates Establishment
Clause); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993) (school district
enjoined from permitting coach to conduct prayers at end of games and at practices); Ellis v.
City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (permanent display of three Latin crosses on
public property violates no preference clause of California Constitution); Sherman v. Commu-
nity Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (phrase "under God" in Pledge of
Allegiance is not prayer but ceremonial invocation and therefore not an establishment of relig-
ion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993); Cleaver v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838
F.Supp. 929 (D.N.J.) (school policy permitting seasonal displays containing religious symbols
and requiring teachers to maintain classroom calendars depicting religious and other holidays did
not violate the Establishment Clause); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 813 F. Supp. 559
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (display of painting of Christ in school hallway violates Establishment
Clause); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (display of Ten Command-
ments and Great Commandment in public courthouse violates Establishment Clause), affrd, 15
F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994); Carpenter v. City & County of San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (city's ownership and display of Latin cross does not violate Establishment
Clause); Freedom from Religion Found. v. Colorado, No. 92CA0107, 1993 WL 212577 (Colo.
Ct. App. June 17, 1993) (display containing Ten Commandments in public park near state capi-
tol violates Establishment Clause); King v. Village of Waunakee, 499 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993) (village's Christmas display in public park was not unconstitutional endorsement of
religion); Doe v. Louisiana Supreme Court, No. CIV. A.91-1635, 1992 WL 373566 (E.D. La.
Dec. 8, 1992) (phrase "in the year of our Lord" contained on the face of state law licenses and
notarial commissions is expression of "ceremonial deism" and not unconstitutional).
104. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Intuition tells us that some offi-
cial 'acknowledgment' is inevitable in a religious society if government is not to adopt a stilted
indifference to the religious life of the people.").
105. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). School prayer, of course, involves both government and private
student speakers. Government speaks when it composes or otherwise directs the content of the
prayer.
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system. The prayer stated simply, "Almighty God, we acknowledge
our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers and our Country."'0 The following year, the
Court struck down state-mandated Bible reading and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public schools in School District v. Schempp. °
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, acknowledged a longstanding
tradition of official religious expression reaching back to the colonial
and founding periods. "The fact that the Founding Fathers believed
devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man
were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the
Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself."' 08 Nevertheless, the
Court held that laws requiring religious ceremonies in public schools
violate the Establishment Clause.
Both Engle and Schempp relied upon findings that the challenged
exercises were purely religious in nature. Engle rested upon the nar-
rower principle that the state is without power to determine the partic-
ular form of prayer or worship to be used in a state-sponsored
religious activity.109 The Court distinguished state-directed prayer
from official religious expressions that are incidental to patriotic ac-
tivities or part of the "many [ceremonial] manifestations in our public
life of belief in God."" 0 While this distinction may explain why the
Constitution forbids state-led school prayer but permits officials to
expose students to religious affirmations in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence or The Star-Spangled Banner,"' it cannot reconcile Engle
with official prayers offered in other settings. Straightforward appli-
cation of the rule in Engle would invalidate such similar practices as
legislative and military chaplains who compose prayers and direct
worship services as a matter of course and the invocation opening the
Court's own sessions. Of course, the Court did not have to decide
106. Id. at 422 (internal quotation omitted).
107. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
108. Id. at 213; see id. ("It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our
national life reflects a religious people .... ").
109. See 370 U.S. at 430 (Under the Establishment Clause, government "is without power to
prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carry-
ing on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity."). Elsewhere in the opinion,
the constitutional prohibition was extended to "writing or sanctioning official prayers." Id. at
435 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 435 n.21.
111. See id. One stanza of The Star-Spangled Banner reads: "Blest with vict'ry and peace
may the heav'n rescued land Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation! Then
conquer we must when our cause it is just, And this be our motto-'In God is our Trust."' Id.
at 440 n.5 (internal quotation omitted).
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these questions, but nothing suggests that a majority of the Justices
considered such practices unconstitutional."
2
The Court announced the broader, more sophisticated purpose and
effect test in Schempp. Strict neutrality between religion and nonreli-
gion means that government action must have a secular purpose and
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 3 The pur-
pose and effect inquiry has been further elaborated in the Lemon test,
which forbids government action that either (1) has no secular pur-
pose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or
(3) fosters an excessive entanglement between government and relig-
ion.1' 4 The Lemon test has been severely criticized by individual mem-
bers of the Court," 5 but it still survives." 6 Cases applying the Lemon
test to government religious speech generally have focused on the pur-
pose and effect prongs. Each prong presents significant analytical
problems.
The secular purpose requirement has never been clearly defined.1 7
It means that government must have some legitimate nonreligious jus-
tification for its action, but the Court has given confusing signals as
to whether the relevant inquiry should focus on subjective motivations
112. The Court in Schempp explicitly sidestepped the question of religious services in the
military. See 374 U.S. at 226 n.10.
113. Id. at 222 ("[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.").
114. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
115. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 655-56
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
116. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (invoking the Lemon test to determine whether
the use of public school facilities after hours to exhibit a religious film would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause); but see id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening
the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District."). The
most recent case involving government aid to religious institutions, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 113 S. Ct. Z462 (1993), while not mentioning Lemon in its analysis, nevertheless
relied on reasoning used in two cases that were decided under the Lemon test, Witters v. Wash-
ington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983).
117. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 613-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging abandonment of secu-
lar purpose requirement because of the Court's failure to adequately explain what "secular pur-
pose" means).
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or objective goals." 8 The more important question is whether secular
considerations must he exclusive, predominant, or meely sufficient.
To require an exclusively nonreligious purpose for government action
would necessitate the complete secularization of government speech or
foster the corruption of religious language and symbols by demanding
they be employed solely for secular political ends. It also would rule
out free exercise accommodations" 9 and forbid legislators from mak-
ing religiously-informed judgments or looking to the religiously-in-
formed judgments of their constituents in shaping public policy. 20
Schempp requires that the secular purpose at least be predominant.
But that raises a third question: How will courts-let alone legislators,
or lawyers for the city council or school board-determine whether
secular or religious considerations control?
The outcome in Schempp turned upon the finding that the state in-
tended to conduct a distinctively religious ceremony in public
schools.' 2' In Murray v. Curlett,12 2 the companion case to Schempp,
there was no similar trial court finding as to the challenged Bible read-
ing and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The State articulated several
secular justifications for the practice, including "the promotion of
moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our
times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of litera-
ture.' 23 Allowing that the state's purpose might not have been
"strictly religious," the Court nevertheless concluded that there was
an illegal religious purpose due to the "pervading religious character
of the ceremony," based largely on the nature of the Bible as an "in-
strument of religion."' 24 Almost twenty years later, in Stone v. Gra-
118. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (The inquiry is whether the "statute
or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.") with Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) ("[Wlhat is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the
possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.").
119. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is disingenuous to look for
a purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise
of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden.").
120. See McConnell, supra note 51, at 144 ("This understanding would be a sharp and un-
warranted break from our political history. From the War of Independence to the abolition
movement, women's suffrage, labor reform, civil rights, nuclear disarmament, and opposition to
pornography, a major source of support for political change has come from explicitly religious
voices.").
121. 374 U.S. 203, 223 ("The trial court in [Schemppl has found that such an opening exer-
cise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the trial
court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and
the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause.") (emphasis added).
122. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
123. Id. at 223.
124. Id. at 224.
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ham, '2 the Court again found a correlation between the religious
nature of a particular practice and an impermissible purpose. In Stone
the state articulated legitimate secular objectives for posting copies of
the Ten Commandments in schools, such as instilling moral values
and illustrating the connection between the Ten Commandments and
our legal system. 126 Rejecting the trial court's finding of a secular pur-
pose for the display, the Court declared that "[t]he pre-eminent pur-
pose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is
plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recita-
tion of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.' 'P1 7
The challenged practices in both Schempp and Stone failed to meet
the secular purpose requirement because they were intrinsically relig-
ious. But if the distinctively religious character of a particular activity
shows a predominant religious purpose, then any official message or
display with religious meaning-a nativity scene, chaplain's prayer, or
even Moses holding the Ten Commandments-is unconstitutional, no
matter how mundane its setting. As Chief Justice Burger observed in
Lynch v. Donnelly,2 1 "[tihat a prayer invoking Divine guidance in
Congress is preceded and followed by debate and partisan conflict
over taxes, budgets, national defense, and myriad mundane subjects,
for example, has never been thought to demean or taint the sacredness
of the invocation." 29 On the other hand, if there is no necessary rela-
tion between the inherently religious nature of a practice and an im-
permissible religious purpose, the question remains: How can we tell
when religious considerations predominate?
125. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional the display of Ten Command-
ments on school room wall for lack of sufficiently secular purpose).
126. The display contained the following disclaimer: "The secular application of the Ten
Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civiliza-
tion and the Common Law of the United States." Id. at 40 n. 1. The Court made no inquiry into
whether historical evidence substantiated this claim.
127. Id. at 41 (footnote omitted). The majority in Stone went beyond Schempp by presuming
a religious purpose from the religious character of the display contrary to both the findings of
the trial court and the legislature's articulated purpose. gut see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (legislature's express motivation is crucial to purpose determination). The
Court was so certain about the impermissible religious purpose that it took the extraordinary
step of reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision below without holding oral argument
or accepting briefs on the merits. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even if
the Court had found a sufficiently secular purpose for the display, it likely would have struck it
down anyway for impermissibly benefiting religion. The Court observed that "[ilf the posted
copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the school-
children to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments." Id. at 42.
128. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
129. Id. at 685.
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The Supreme Court took a different view of the secular purpose
requirement in Lynch when it held that a city's use of a nativity scene
in its Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause. It
rejected the district court's inference from the religious nature of the
nativity scene that the city had no secular purpose for the display.
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority that to "[flocus exclu-
sively on the religious component of any activity [will] inevitably lead
to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause."' 30 Considering
the display in the larger context of the Christmas holiday season, he
concluded that it served a secular purpose, namely, "to celebrate the
Holiday" and "[to] depictl the ... origins" of a "significant histori-
cal religious event long celebrated in the Western World.' ' 3' The dis-
senters still presumed a necessary connection between the religious
character of the display and an impermissible religious purpose. In
their view, to find a secular purpose meant that the nativity scene's
religious message had to be obscured. 32 The Chief Justice, of course,
insisted that the majority's assessment of the display's secular purpose
in no way diminished its religious significance. 3 3 Given this conclu-
sion, however, it is impossible to reconcile Lynch with Stone. The na-
tivity scene and the Ten Commandments are distinctively religious
symbols and both depict significant historical events in Christian and
Jewish theology.
Chief Justice Burger also declared that the secular purpose require-
ment, as elaborated in Schempp and Stone, was met so long as the
activity was not "motivated wholly by religious considerations.' '3 4
This means that religious considerations may predominate so long as
there is some plausible secular purpose, no matter how minor.'35 By
130. Id. at 680.
131. Id.at680-81.
132. Justice Blackmun complained that the majority had "relegated [the cr&he] to the role
of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any
inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an
integral part." Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Brennan suggested that
"by focusing on the holiday 'context' in which the nativity scene appear[s]," the majority "seeks
to explain away the clear religious import of the creche," therefore making it "no different from
Santa's house or reindeer." Id. at 705, 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 685 n.12.
134. Id. at 680 (emphasis added). But see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) ("The
pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly relig-
ious in nature.") (emphasis added); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 ("[E]ven if its purpose is not
strictly religious . . .the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident. ) (em-
phasis added).
135. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6 ("We hold only that Pawtucket has a secular purpose
for its display, which is all that Lemon v. Kurtzman requires. Were the test that the government
must have 'exclusively secular' objectives, much of the conduct and legislation this Court has
approved in the past would have been invalidated.") (citation omitted).
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contrast, Justice O'Connor, also citing Schempp and Stone, main-
tained in her concurrence that the secular purpose requirement "is not
satisfied .. by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however
dominated by religious purposes.""' Since the Lynch decision was
five-to-four, and Justice O'Connor differed with the rest of the ma-
jority on this point, we are left with no authoritative determination of
what "secular purpose" means. Does it mean that government cannot
be motivated wholly by religious purposes? Or, does it also forbid ac-
tions dominated by religious aims?
The secular purpose test also is indeterminate where religious means
are used to achieve a secular objective. The impetus for many tradi-
tional government practices using religious language or symbols was
the perception of a strong connection between the flourishing of relig-
ion and the public good. These practices were intended to encourage
religion, not just for religion's sake, but also for some derivative pub-
lic benefit. When Thomas Jefferson asked those listening to his Sec-
ond Inaugural Address to "join in supplications with me that [God]
will . . . enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils,
and prosper their measures,' ' 3 7 his appeal obviously was for the peo-
ple to engage in a religious activity, but he intended they do so for the
common good. The national government, as we shall see in Part III of
this Article, issued many official proclamations during the revolution-
ary and founding periods calling on citizens to pray for the fledgling
nation. Careful examination of those proclamations reveals that they
were not merely formal or commemorative, nor did they exploit the
practice for purely political ends. The founders plainly believed in the
efficacy of public prayer. As the people and their leaders sought the
guidance and protection of divine Providence, the nation would pros-
per politically, economically, and spiritually. Other official pron-
ouncements emphasized the importance of religion to the maintenance
of a republican regime. Apart from its truth value, religion was widely
perceived as providing social stability and cohesion. Again, the pur-
pose behind such messages was at the same time both religious and
secular-to advance both religion and republic-for it was widely un-
derstood that to encourage religion was to safeguard the republic. It is
anyone's guess how the secular purpose requirement would apply to
these practices.' 38
136. Id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in 1 A COMAPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 382 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1899) [hereinafter Richardson].
138. Besides Schempp and Stone, the Court invalidated teaching creation science in public
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The effects test suffers from similar ambiguities. It forbids govern-
ment action that has a "primarv effect" of advancing religion. if
"primary" is used comparatively to mean "principal," then the test
would only require that the predominant consequences of the activity
be secular, and thus would permit a considerable religious side ef-
fect.3 9 This would conflict, however, with the "no-aid" dictum in Ev-
erson v. Board of Education,140 as well as the Court's refusal to
tolerate certain Establishment Clause violations as de minimis.14, On
the other hand, if "primary" is used substantively to mean an effect
that is immediate, direct, and consequential,' 42 then many forms of
official religious expression will likely withstand constitutional chal-
lenge because they only incidentally benefit religion. It is worth noting
that the Court did not find the prayers or Bible reading in either Engle
or Schempp to have had any substantial effect of advancing or incul-
cating religious belief. The twenty-two word Regents' Prayer has been
described as a "pathetically vacuous assertion of piety"'143 that was
"more doctrinally flavorless than grace before a community chest
schools because it lacked a secular purpose in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89
(1987). Laws have been struck down for lack of a secular purpose in only two other Establish-
ment Clause cases. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (statute requiring moment of
silence in public schools "was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose"); Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (state prohibition on teaching evolution in public schools is
clearly religious in purpose). A post hoc secular rationale is all that should be required for any
government action to satisfy the Establishment Clause. See Sullivan, supra note 32, at 197 n.9
(favoring requirement of secular rationale over secular motivation because "a requirement of
secular motivation trenches too far on the freedoms of conscience and expression of citizens and
legislators").
139. See Giannella, supra note 64, at 533.
140. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (The Establishment Clause forbids government from "pass[ing]
laws which aid one religion [or] aid all religions.").
141. The Court rejected de minimis arguments in Engle and Schempp by reference to Madi-
son's Memorial and Remonstrance. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) ("To those
who may subscribe to the view that because the Regents' official prayer is so brief and general
there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment . . . it may be
appropriate to say in the words of James Madison . . . 'flit is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties .... '); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("The
breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent
and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liber-
ties."' ). In Lee v. Weisman the Court refused to characterize the brief graduation prayers as de
minimis because it "would be an affront to the Rabbi who offered them and to all those for
whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority." 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2659 (1992); see id. at 2670 n.3, 2678 (Souter, J., concurring) (distinguishing presidential
religious proclamations as "at worst trivial breaches of the Establishment Clause" and "in-
habit[ing] a pallid zone worlds apart" from graduation prayers).
142. Giannella, supra note 64, at 533.
143. Louis H. Pollack, The Supreme Court 1962 Term Foreword: Public Prayers in Public
Schools, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 63 (1963).
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luncheon." ' " Is religion substantially advanced when a brief portion
of the Bible is read without comment to school children, but only inci-
dentally advanced when those same children only moments later sing
from national anthem, "[M]ay the heav'n rescued land Praise the
Pow'r that hath made and preserved us as a nation .... And this-be
our motto 'In God is our Trust'"? 45 I doubt the meaning of the Es-
tablishment Clause is found in such obscure distinctions. Conversely,
if distinctively religious exercises conducted by the government ad-
vance religion per se, then it is impossible to distinguish between
prayer in public schools and prayer in Congress. Both are religious
exercises, both primarily aid or advance religion, but are both uncon-
stitutional? Not according to Marsh v. Chambers,'" which upheld leg-
islative prayers and chaplains. Of course, the Marsh Court did not
arrive at that result by applying the primary effect test, nor could it.
To sustain the longstanding tradition of legislative prayer, the Court
had to abandon the effects test and justify the practice on historical
grounds. So long as the challenged message or symbol retains its dis-
tinctively religious character, it will advance religion to some degree.
In those cases where the message or symbol also confers a significant
secular benefit, distinguishing between primary and secondary effects
largely will be left up to a judge's own predilections. For instance,
how does one determine the primary effect of a county's display of a
large Latin cross atop a hill which serves both as an occasional gather-
ing place for religious services and a navigational aid for pilots? 41
In Lynch the Court used a comparative approach to determine
whether the nativity display impermissibly advanced religion. It con-
cluded that the display was "[no] more beneficial to and [no] more an
endorsement of religion"'"4 than other practices previously held not to
violate the Establishment Clause or other presumably permissible ack-
nowledgments of religion in public life, such as official recognition of
the origins of the Christmas holiday or the exhibition of religious
paintings in government museums. 49 William Van Alstyne calls this
the "any more than" test: governmental advancement of religion is
not objectionable if it does not go beyond what has been commonly
144. Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to Engle, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 45
(1962).
145. This line is from The Star-Spangled Banner, quoted in Engle, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
146. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
147. See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
148. 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984).
149. Id. at 681-83.
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acceptable in the past. 150 In other words, there is no substantive base-
line that reflects constitutional values; rather, everything is relative to
what government has traditionally done. Without some baseline, how-
ever, how does a judge go about comparing such dissimilar practices
as Sunday closing laws, tax exemptions, and nativity scenes? How can
the display of religious paintings in government museums provide a
meaningful baseline if the constitutionality of that practice has never
been explained? Like the purpose prong of the Lemon test, the effects
inquiry is an invitation to the selection of outcomes based on judicial
preferences. Neither requirement ultimately is able to supply judicially
manageable standards for making sensitive judgments regarding offi-
cial religious observances or references, or for justifying those widely
accepted practices that likely will withstand any constitutional chal-
lenge.
B. The Historical Approach
In its first case involving official religious speech outside the public
school setting, the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers5' upheld the
opening of each session of Nebraska's legislature with a prayer by a
chaplain paid with public funds. The purpose and effect tests were
ignored in favor of a historical inquiry into whether the founders in-
tended to forbid legislative chaplains and prayers when they enacted
the Establishment Clause.152 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the ma-
jority, marshaled persuasive evidence to show that "[t]he opening of
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer
is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country."' 53
Conceding that the longevity of a practice alone does not make it con-
stitutional, Burger was unwilling to lightly cast aside a national prac-
tice that had survived two centuries. Moreover, he maintained that
"[i]t can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the
First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a Chaplain for each House
and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for sub-
mission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable." 54
150. William Van Aistyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall -
A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 783.
151. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
152. See id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes no pretense of subjecting
Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally struc-
tured our inquiry under the Establishment Clause .... [I]f the Court were to judge legislative
prayer through the unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause.").
153. Id. at 786.
154. Id. at 790.
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What is missing from this approach is a more principled explana-
tion for why the founders did not think that legislative chaplains and
prayers offend the Establishment Clause.' 55 To be sure, Burger did
suggest that the First Continental Congress' decision to open its ses-
sions with prayer despite objections from two of its members shows
that the delegates "did not consider opening prayers as a proselytizing
activity or as symbolically placing the government's official seal of
approval on one religious view.' '1 56 But he offered no clue as to what
features about the prayers ensured that they would not be viewed as
proselytization or an endorsement of a particular religious position, or
why the founders defined an establishment of religion in those terms.
Consequently, Marsh sheds virtually no light on the meaning of the
Establishment Clause beyond the particular practice of legislative
chaplains and prayer. Little in the opinion is useful for analyzing the
constitutionality of other forms of official religious expression that do
not possess a historical pedigree that reaches back to the practices of
the founders.
C. "Ceremonial Deism" and the Almost Secular State
In his Lynch v. Donnelly dissent, Justice Brennan stated that "the
Court has never comprehensively addressed the extent to which gov-
ernment may acknowledge religion by, for example, incorporating re-
ligious references into public ceremonies and proclamations, and I do
not presume to offer a comprehensive approach."'5 Nevertheless, he
proposed three principles for "tracing the narrow channels" which
must be followed if government religious speech is to satisfy the Es-
tablishment Clause.' 58 First, under Zorach v. Clauson,5 9 he would
permit the government to accommodate individual religious exercises.
In his view, that would justify a decision to declare December 25th a
public holiday. Second, it would be constitutional for government to
continue solely for secular reasons a practice that had religious origins
and may retain certain religious connotations, such as Sunday closing
laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland'w and official observance of
155. For this reason, Professor McConnell views Marsh as an example of "originalism gone
awry." See Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361-
63 (1988).
156. 463 U.S. at 792 (internal quotations omitted). The objections raised by John Jay and
John Rutledge and the response offered by Samuel Adams are discussed infra in text accompa-
nying notes 256-57.
157. 465 U.S. 668, 715 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 715-17.
159. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding an off-campus "released time" program of private re-
ligious instruction for public school children).
160. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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Thanksgiving Day. Third, Justice Brennan would allow (with some
uncertainty) government to recognize pblicly those religious beliefs
and practices that survive as a form of "ceremonial deism," that is,
practices that are "protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant
religious content.' ' 6' In this category he included references to God in
the Pledge of Allegiance and national motto "In God we trust," the
invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable Court,"
religious works on display at the National Gallery, and religious allu-
sions in presidential inaugural addresses. Such references, he ex-
plained, serve to "solemniz[e] public occasions, or inspir[e]
commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply
could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to
purely nonreligious phrases. i16 This function, combined with their
long history, gives these practices an "essentially" or "dominantly"
secular message. For example, Brennan suggested that "[tihe refer-
ence to divinity in the revised pledge of allegiance . . .may merely
recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been
founded 'under God.' Thus reciting the pledge may be no more of a
religious exercise than the reading aloud of Lincoln's Gettysburg Ad-
dress, which contains an allusion to the same historical fact."' 63 The
"ceremonial deism" approach was adopted by the majority in County
of Allegheny v. ACL U. '
161. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The phrase was borrowed from Dean
Rostow's 1962 Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown University. Id. at 716 n.24. Justice Brennan had
articulated this principle in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), and School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
162. 465 U.S. at 717.
163. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 304. Contrary to Justice Brennan's characterization, the House
Report notes that "[tihe inclusion of God in our pledge ... acknowledge[s] the dependence of
our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator." H.R. REP. No.
f693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340. Similarly, Lin-
coln's use of the phrase "under God" in the Gettysburg Address was hardly a reference to the
founding period. When he concluded his Address by urging that "we here highly resolve that
these dead shall not have died in vain-that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of
freedom-and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth," Lincoln was speaking of the nation as it was in his time, not at the time of the
founders. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg
(Nov. 19, 1863), in VII THE COLLECTED WORTS OF AaHAM LiNCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
164. 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989) ("Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto
and the pledge, characterizing them as consistent with the proposition that government may not
communicate an endorsement of religious belief. We need not return to the subject of 'ceremo-
nial deism,' because there is an obvious distinction between creche displays and references to
God in the motto and the pledge.") (citations omitted). See also id. at 595 n.46 (opinion of
Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J.); id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment, joined by Brennan and Stevens, J.J.).
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To his credit, Justice Brennan did not follow Justice Blackmun who
strained in Allegheny to diminish the perceived religious message of
the challenged displays by emphasizing their secular dimensions.1 6 In
both Allegheny and Lynch, Brennan recognized the distinctively relig-
ious character of the symbols. ' Nevertheless, his designation of cer-
tain practices as "ceremonial deism" is subject to strong empirical
challenge. While phrases such as "In God we trust" and "under
God" may have no religious significance to some (including, appar-
ently, Justice Brennan), it does not follow that the same holds true for
everyone. My guess is that most people probably do not even think
about these phrases very often. But when they do, can we say with
assurance that such words fail to inspire religious thoughts at least for
some, especially when polls consistently show that an overwhelming
majority of Americans say they believe in God? 6 Out of the millions
of school children who recite the Pledge of Allegiance each day, surely
there are many whose thoughts are lifted to God, even if just for a
few seconds. Indeed, I suspect they are far more likely to turn their
thoughts toward God than to contemplate the religious origins of our
nation.
Justice Brennan's "ceremonial deism" is especially troubling for at
least two other reasons. First, it reflects a subtle bias against religion.
As Judge Manion recently pointed out, this approach selects only re-
ligious phrases as losing their meaning through rote repetition. '6 Do
not other equally repeated secular phrases in the Pledge, such as "in-
divisible" and "liberty and justice for all," also become meaningless
under Brennan's logic? Second, it requires judicial scrutiny into the
religious potency of the message. To say that such messages are in
effect meaningless comes perilously close to saying that they are un-
true, and that is something beyond the competency of courts to de-
cide. 69
D. The Endorsement Test
A variation on the purpose and effect elements of the Lemon test is
the endorsement test, first proposed by Justice O'Connor in her con-
165. See id. at 613-21 (Blackmun, J.).
166. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe message of the
creche begins and ends with reverence for a particular image of the divine.").
167. See generally GEORGE GAILuP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE's RELIGION: AsERIcAN
FAITH IN THE 9(0s (1990); New Christendom, EcONOPUST, Dec. 24, 1988, at 61.
168. Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion,
J., concurring).
169. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
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curring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 70 and increasingly embraced by
the Court in subsequent cases. 71 In her view, the Establishment
Clause prohibits government from "mak[ing] adherence to religion
relevant, in reality or in public perception, to [a person's] standing in
the political community.' ' 72 The most direct infringement of this pro-
hibition is "government endorsement or disapproval of religion.' '1 73
Justice O'Connor's fundamental concern is that our religiously di-
verse society remain politically inclusive: "Endorsement sends a mes-
sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disap-
proval sends the opposite message." 7 4
The principal difference between the endorsement concept and
Justice Brennan's "ceremonial deism" approach is that Justice O'Con-
nor would permit the state to display a religious symbol if its larger
setting negates any endorsement of the religious content of that symbol,
even though the symbol retains its distinctively religious meaning within
the setting. 75 In other words, the religious message of the display would
be mitigated in favor of a predominantly pluralistic message of official
respect for all beliefs. 76 Justice O'Connor's emphasis on religious plu-
ralism, as opposed to secularism, and on a political community that is
broadly inclusive is a welcome refinement of the Lemon test. She quite
properly recognizes that in some circumstances government action may
advance religion without endorsing it. 77 Several commentators,
170. 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985); Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989);
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-52 (1990).
172. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
173. Id. at 688.
174. Id. The test also has been formulated as precluding the government "from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or pre-
ferred." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 593-94 (Blackmun, J.) (claiming that the concepts of "endorsement," "favoritism,"
and "promotion" are the same).
175. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 633-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
176. See id. at 634 ("[T]he relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether
the [challenged government action) sends a message of government endorsement ... or whether
it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs.").
177. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 ("Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disap-
proval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not
to require invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a pri-
mary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.").
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however, have criticized the endorsement test as being fundamentally
flawed. "I
One criticism is the difficulty of defining "endorsement." The term
itself can mean anything from acknowledgment to approval to sanc-
tion. Nevertheless, in the context of government speech, Justice
O'Connor has distinguished official "acknowledgment" of religion
from "endorsement." In her Lynch concurrence, she classified as per-
missible acknowledgments such practices as legislative prayer and
chaplains, official declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday,
placing "In God we trust" on our coins, and opening court sessions
with "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."'7 9
These practices, however, look more like official endorsements of re-
ligion. Consider the various ways government can recognize religion
in its speech. First, the state can acknowledge the existence or role of
religious belief in society without expressing any judgment about the
value or veracity of that belief. The study of comparative religion,
religious history, or the literary and historical dimensions of the Bible
falls into this category. Second, the state also can acknowledge the
value of religious belief to society without expressing any judgment
about the veracity of that belief. One well-known example is the
Northwest Ordinance's assertion that "[rieligion, morality, and
knowledge [are] necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind."8 0 Such statements are normative in a utilitarian sense, but
agnostic as to the validity of religious claims. Finally, the state can
acknowledge the truthfulness (or in a weak sense, the plausibility) of
religious belief.'81 This occurs whenever the government treats religion
as if its claims are true, factual, or legitimate. The last two forms of
acknowledgment obviously would qualify as endorsements of religion.
Only those practices that acknowledge religion in an objective or de-
scriptive sense can be said not to endorse religion. Yet many, if not
most, of the widely accepted usages Justice O'Connor mentioned in
Lynch are more than merely descriptive of religion. Legislative and
courtroom invocations, for example, assume the truthfulness of a fun-
damental premise of religious belief-the existence of a Supreme Be-
ing-unless, of course, we deem them meaningless incantations.' 8 2
178. For the most persuasive arguments against the endorsement test, see McConnell, supra
note 51, at 147-57, and Smith, supra note 56.
179. 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 1 Tim FOUNDERS' CONSITruTON
27, 28 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Learner eds., 1987).
181. See Smith, supra note 56, at 282-83 (distinguishing between endorsements of "value"
and endorsements of "truthfulness").
182. In County ofAllegheny v. ACLU Justice O'Connor embraced Justice Brennan's "cere-
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The ambiguity of the endorsement concept makes it susceptible to
observer bias. If the Establishment Clause forbids official practices
that create the perception that government has endorsed religion, the
question is, Whose perception counts? 18 3 The concept depends ulti-
mately on the eye of the beholder. For this reason, "endorsement"
cannot be defined in a way that is both generally acceptable and use-
ful. When government acts favorably toward a particular religion,
those who are sympathetic toward that religious perspective will al-
most never perceive an endorsement, while those who do not share the
perspective almost always will. Justice O'Connor's attempt to remedy
this problem by calling for judicial application of a fictitious "objec-
tive" or "reasonable" observer is not entirely satisfying.'4 This
falsely assumes that there is a single impartial perspective from which
to judge whether government has "endorsed" religion. It is simply
impossible to define an objective or reasonable observer without im-
puting to that observer certain characteristics that ultimately will af-
fect his or her perceptions of endorsement. Thus, William Marshall
asks, "Is the objective observer (or average person) a religious person,
an agnostic, a separationist, a person sharing the predominant relig-
ious sensibility of the community, or one holding a minority view?" 85
If the principal concern of the endorsement test is that government is
making some feel excluded, perhaps the relevant perspective should be
that of the religious outsider.8 6 However, as Professor Karst points
out, that approach presents two difficulties of its own. First, in a na-
tion as religiously diverse as our own, there is no single uniform outsi-
der's perspective.8 7 Second, it would be difficult for judges to assume
the view of a religious outsider because by-and-large "[j]udges are
themselves acculturated to a set of perspectives that are emphatically
monial deism" principle with respect to Thanksgiving holidays. 492 U.S. 573, 630-31 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Nevertheless, she has been care-
ful in other instances not to minimize the religious content of the challenged symbol in order to
preserve its constitutionality. Id. at 633-36.
183. Smith, supra note 56, at 291.
184. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 537 (1986). See Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State
Relations in Contemporary American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371, 375 (arguing that a
person's view of church-state relations usually derives from that person's own theological or
philosophical worldview).
186. See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1279, 1293-94; Norman Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and
Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 863, 868 (1986).
187. Karst, supra note 14, at 516-17.
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not the perspectives of outsiders." '188 In the end, of course, most
would agree that it is the judge's own perception that counts. Judge
Easterbrook reminds us that "[wihen everything matters, when noth-
ing is dispositive, when we must juggle incommensurable factors, a
judge can do little but announce his gestalt."' 8 9 That is why the en-
dorsement test can be essentially reduced to the exercise of a judge's
own intuitions and biases.'90 And the extent to which judicial impres-
sions can differ over what constitutes an endorsement of religion is no
better illustrated than in County of Allegheny v. A CL U.'91
A second and related criticism is that the endorsement test permits
constitutional claims to be raised against governmental action solely
on the ground that such action is offensive or makes people feel ex-
cluded or stigmatized.1 92 Since the purpose of the endorsement inquiry
is to protect the sensibilities of nonadherents, establishment is formu-
lated as a function of personal perceptions or feelings rather than as
an abuse of government power.' 93 By contrast, religious believers who
maintain that government action has exposed them to ideas contrary
to their faith have no claim under the Establishment or Free Exercise
clauses. 94 Cases involving compelled allegiance to an official political
188. Id. at 517. Mark Tushnet similarly maintains that "judges will always be broadly repre-
sentative of the general population, and will be susceptible to all the distortions of interpretation
that membership in the majority entails." Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18
CONN. L. Rav. 701, 711 (1986). In many instances, however, judges may more closely represent
society's secularized intellectual elite than the general population. If that is true, they would
more likely assume the view of the nonreligious or antireligious outsider rather than the view of
one who belongs to a religious minority.
189. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eas-
terbrook, J., dissenting).
190. See Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 795, 816 (1993)
("The 'objective observer' canard is merely a cloaking device, obscuring intuitive judgments
made from the individual judge's own personal perspective."); McConnell, supra note 51, at 151
("A finding of 'endorsement' serves only to mask reliance on untutored intuition.").
191. Compare 492 U.S. 573, 637-46 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Marshall, J. and Stevens, J.) (display of menorah conveys message of endorse-
ment of religion) and id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.) (same) with id. at 613-21 (Blackmun, J.) (display of menorah
does not convey message of endorsement of religion) and id. at 632-37 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (same).
192. For an excellent critique of the use of these concepts in defining endorsement, see Wil-
liam P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurispru-
dence, 66 IND. L.J. 351 (1991).
193. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("There is always a risk that [the display of religious] symbols will offend nonmembers of
the faith being advertised ....").
194. Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994); Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Neither may the
state restrict private speech that is offensive to religious sensibilities. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940).
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viewpoint have not held that the governmental speech itself was un-
constitutional, even though it was offensive to dissenters. 9 Under
current equal protection doctrine, racial minorities who claim that
they feel stigmatized by government action but who have suffered no
harm in addition to the psychological affront have no constitutional
claim.'9 Indeed, outside of Justice O'Connor's endorsement concept,
the government's use of controversial speech does not give rise to an
assertable constitutional violation for those who are merely listeners
or observers, no matter how irritating or insulting the messages may
be. 97 In the colonial and founding periods, state establishments cre-
ated real political disabilities for disfavored groups through such de-
vices as religious test oaths. 98 The endorsement test errs by leaping
from real disabilities to felt disabilities. When government speaks reli-
giously, "no one loses the right to vote, the freedom to speak, or any
other state or federal right."' 9 9
The indeterminacy of the endorsement test is especially evident
when analyzing official practices that have continued over a long pe-
riod of time. For over fifty years, the University of Virginia School of
Law displayed a plaque containing a "Prayer Before the Study of
Law" written by Samuel Johnson in 1765. The plaque was a gift from
a former student and hung on a wall in the school's main hallway
where classrooms are located. Other pictures, plaques, and commem-
orative memorabilia are displayed in the school's hallways. The
plaque was removed after a student complaint because school officials
thought it might be an endorsement of religion since it contained re-
ferences to "Almighty God" and "Jesus Christ." Over 235 students
195. Objecting students in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) were permitted to opt out of the flag salute, but the Court did not require that the flag
salute itself be terminated. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court held that the
state could not force a Jehovah's Witness to be "mobile billboard" for its "Live Free or Die"
motto, but it did not prevent the state from displaying that or other disagreeable messages in a
noncoercive fashion.
196. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 166 (1972). For a discussion of why "endorsement" does not rise to a constitutionally cog-
nizable level of stigmatization, see Marshall, supra note 192, at 363-66.
197. See Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (plaintiffs who "fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a
consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence pre-
sumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees" have no standing to
sue).
198. CURRY, supra note 42, at 80-81.
199. Smith, supra note 56, at 307. See Tushnet, supra note 188, at 712 ("[I]t is not clear why
symbolic exclusion should matter so long as 'nonadherents' are in fact actually included in the
political community."); see also CARTER, supra note 74, at 94 ("The question should not be
whether members of 'minority' religions ... are offended or not. The Establishment Clause
does not regulate psychology.").
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSLY
subsequently signed a petition requesting that the plaque be returned
to the wall, while a second petition bearing more than 100 signatures
supported the plaque's removal.2 0 Under the endorsement concept,
the school was faced with a dilemma. Displaying the plaque would
send a message to those who object to the prayer that they are outsi-
ders, but removing the plaque would send a message to those who
favor the prayer that they are outsiders. Unfortunately, neither group
could have its way, and there was no "neutral" reason for choosing
one over the other. If the school were deciding whether to hang the
plaque for the first time, the endorsement test might be more appeal-
ing. But here, as with most other instances of government religious
speech, the school was not writing on a clean slate.101
E. The Coercion Test
The most recently formulated alternative for analyzing Establish-
ment Clause cases is the coercion test proposed by Justices Kennedy,
White, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 22 and embraced by Justice Thomas in Lee v. Weisman.203 As
explained by Justice Kennedy, the Establishment Clause contains
"two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to sup-
port or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not...
give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree that it in fact 'estab-
lishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do So.1'204
The idea of coercion, Professor McConnell points out, is grounded
largely in the distinction between persuasion and force.2°1 While
speech usually is part of the coercive process, speech with no accom-
panying threat of harm is never coercive. As John Locke observed,
"it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to press
200. Jim Denery, Plaque Taken Down but Debate Goes On, THE DAILY PROGaEss, Dec. 12,
1992, at B1, B2.
201. The plaque eventually was exhibited even more prominently in a less-traveled area on
the second floor of the school's library, being placed along with letters and photographs relating
to its donation in a display case normally reserved for the school's historical memorabilia. While
the controversy has subsided, the question of whether its continued display constitutes an en-
dorsement of religion remains.
202. 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and
White, Ji., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
203. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678-86 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
204. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). See
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guar-
antees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer-
cise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so."') (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
205. McConnell, supra note 51, at 159.
19941 1223
1224 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 21:1183
with arguments, another with penalties." '  Justice Kennedy rejects
this conception of coercion. Instead, he maintains that "[sipeech may
coerce in some circumstances," thus "[slymbolic recognition . . . of
religious faith may violate the [Establishment] Clause in an extreme
case." 2 0 One example of such coercive speech, Kennedy explained in
Allegheny, is a permanent display of a large Latin cross atop city hall.
"[SIuch an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf
of a particular religion." 28 Professor McConnell suggests, however,
that "[tihis conclusion may be correct, but it has no logical connec-
tion to the coercion test."," The failure to show a principled link be-
tween coercion and proselytization underscores a major flaw in the
coercion test. It cannot explain why a large cross atop city hall is nec-
essarily coercive if its passive display does not obligate anyone to par-
ticipate in religious exercise. Neither would it forbid Congress from
declaring Christianity to be the official religion of the United States,
so long as no one was required to affirm Christian beliefs, provide
financial support, or attend church. 210 It is highly doubtful the foun-
ders would consider either permissible under the Establishment
Clause, and no one presently on the Supreme Court appears to hold
such a view. ' That is why the concept of coercion cannot sum up
everything there is to say about the Establishment Clause. 212
Justice Kennedy departs from traditional legal conceptions of coer-
cion in another, more significant way. By coercion he means not only
"direct coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of religion
206. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689). reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTnTUrION, supra note 180, at 53.
207. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661.
208. Id.
209. McConnell, supra note 51, at 162.
210. See Foley, supra note 78, at 968.
211. Even the dissenting Justices in Weisman were unwilling to make coercion the exclusive
Establishment Clause inquiry. They recognized that our constitutional tradition also forbids
"government-sponsored endorsement of religion ... where the endorsement is sectarian." 112
S. Ct. 2649, 2684-85 (1992).
212. The coercion standard has been criticized for rendering the Establishment Clause redun-
dant of the Free Exercise Clause. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2673 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[A]
literal application of the coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a virtual nul-
lity .... ); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("To require a showing of coercion, even indirect coercion, as an essential element of
an Establishment Clause violation would make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy."). See
also Sullivan, supra note 32, at 205 ("[A] 'coercion' test for establishment would reduce the
Establishment Clause to a redundancy. If the Establishment Clause is to have independent
meaning, it must bar something other than coercion of private citizens into confessions of offi-
cial faith."). For a persuasive refutation of the redundancy argument, see Paulsen, supra note
190. at 843 n.171.
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that the Framers knew, ' 213 but also indirect forms of coercion such as
peer pressure on schoolchildren to participate in state-led classroom
prayers.14 This distinction is the principal point of disagreement be-
tween Justice Kennedy on the one hand, and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist on the other. In Weisman Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the majority, concluded that psychological pressures
on students to stand and bow their heads during the invocation and
benediction offered at their graduation ceremony rendered the prayers
indirectly coercive and therefore unconstitutional."' The latter group
of Justices dissented on the ground that "[tihe coercion that was a
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of relig-
ious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty."12 6 "I see no warrant," Justice Scalia wrote, "for expanding
the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty-a
brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us
who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather
than of Freud. ''21 7 Justice Kennedy's position has been criticized for
confusing state action and private action by allowing an Establish-
ment Clause claim based on social pressure to engage in religious
practice.21 1 I discuss the problem of defining "coercion" in Part IV,
where I propose a refinement of the coercion principle for use in cases
involving government religious speech.
When applied to official religious speech or symbols, none of the
above tests has either the coherence or normative appeal that is desira-
213. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661. In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy identified direct taxation to
support religion and test oaths as two examples of such coercion. Id.
214. Id. at 661 n.1 (arguing that the prayer invalidated in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), was "unquestionably coercive in an indirect manner").
215. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-60.
216. Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ., dissent-
ing).
217. Id. at 2684. The view that coercion should be limited to direct legal force or threat of
penalty has been rejected as historically flawed. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support
for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 46-
48 (1991). Professor Laycock argues that proposals for general assessments to support the clergy
in Virginia and Maryland did not require anyone to support religion at all, since taxes could be
designated for secular purposes rather than religious ones or avoided altogether by declaring
unbelief. This nevertheless would have created opportunities for dissenters to be exposed to the
social coercion of the community. The proposals were soundly defeated. Laycock's argument is
ultimately unpersuasive because, as he concedes, the measures were not completely noncoercive
in a direct legal sense and because nothing suggests that the proposals were opposed and de-
feated on the ground that they would create social pressure to designate one's tax in religiously-
acceptable ways. Nevertheless, for the reasons mentioned in Part IV, I agree that the concept of
coercion must be understood broadly to encompass direct and indirect forms of governmental
compulsion. See infra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
218. See Paulsen, supra note 190, at 825-43.
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ble in Religion Clause jurisprudence. A new approach is needed. We
can begin constructing that approach by examining how the founding
generation perceived government religious speech and religious estab-
lishments.
III. GOVERNMENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE FOUNDING PERIOD
Questions raised by government religious speech must be resolved in
accord with a historical understanding of what the Establishment
Clause was intended to forbid. The Clause states a sweeping principle.
The founders could have listed specific rules with detailed exceptions,
but chose not to do so. Instead, they forbade the government from
making any law "respecting an establishment of religion." 2 19 The text
itself gives us some clues to its meaning. The Clause does not prohibit
laws "advancing religion" or even "respecting religion," but rather
laws "respecting an establishment of religion. ' 220 Neither does the
Clause specifically forbid official expression of religious ideas or sen-
timents, unless that expression constitutes an establishment of relig-
ion. The text, however, does not tell us what an establishment of
religion is.22 That depends, at least in part, on what the founders
themselves understood it to mean. After all, words take their meaning
from historical and social as well as textual contexts. 222
219. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
220. Id. (emphasis added). Some think that the Establishment Clause expressly forbids any
governmental action that concerns religion. Justice Stevens, for example, made this point in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU:
It is also significant that the final draft contains the word "respecting." Like "touch-
ing," "respecting" means concerning, or with reference to. But it also means with
respect-that is, "reverence," "good will," "regard"-to. Taking into account this
richer meaning, the Establishment Clause, in banning laws that concern religion, espe-
cially prohibits those that pay homage to religion.
492 U.S. 573, 649 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). But that is not what the clause says. It forbids only laws "respecting
an establishment of religion." During the debates over the wording of the Establishment Clause,
the -(ouse initially approved a sweeping amendment offered by Samuel Livermore that would
have prohibited Congress from making laws "touching religion." That wording later was re-
jected in favor of the version sent to the Senate which read "Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing religion." I ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Aug. 20, 1789). See 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
159, 166 (House Journal) (L. de Pauw ed., 1972); 1 id. at 136 (Senate Journal).
221. For a helpful discussion of possible meanings derived from the text itself, see William
W. Van Alstyne, What Is "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 909 (1987).
222. That is why "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). The importance of the founders' understanding
of the Religion Clauses has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proposing that the goal is to frame a principle 'that is not
only grounded in the history and language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable
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We must resist the recurring urge to reduce the meaning of the Es-
tablishment Clause to a single formulaic abstraction that can nicely be
applied in every circumstance. The Supreme Court's own efforts in
this regard reveal that no single unifying test for identifying an estab-
lishment of religion will yield consistent and coherent results when ap-
plied to the myriad ways religion and government intersect in the
modern welfare-regulatory state. Vague metaphors and mechanical
tests are poor substitutes for reasoned analysis of the text, history,
and purposes of the Establishment Clause. 23 That is not to say, of
course, that it is impossible to define broad principles that will aid in
identifying what the Establishment Clause prohibits. These principles
derive from the underlying values, justifications, and symmetry of the
Religion Clauses, as well as what the founders considered as paradig-
matic establishments of religion. Instead of bending the principles into
metaphors or tests, we must use them to build flexible and nuanced
approaches applicable to specific relevant categories of government
action involving religion-religious speech, funding, regulation, and
accommodation.
A. The Rise of an Expansive View of Religious Liberty
While this is not the place to recount in detail the development of
religious liberty in preconstitutional America, a summary of what that
history teaches is nonetheless useful. The original design behind relig-
ious establishments in the colonies was to utilize civil power to protect
of consistent application to the relevant problems"') (quoting Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the
Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1963)
(footnotes omitted)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (noting that the Court's inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause has "comported with what history reveals was the con-
temporaneous understanding of its guarantees"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671
(1970) (noting that the Court had previously refused "to construe the Religion Clauses with a
literalness that would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by his-
tory"); School Dist. v..Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("IT]he
line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with
history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) ("[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied
..... "); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No provi-
sion of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the
religious clause of the First Amendment.").
223. See Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 42, at 1007 ("The Supreme Court
is rarely content with a broad principle if it can substitute a three-part test."). Regarding the
"wall of separation" metaphor, Justice Reed warned that "[a] rule of law should not be drawn
from a figure of speech." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting). See Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom
Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 678-81 (1992) (criticizing the "wall
of separation" metaphor).
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the purity of the church from heretics and schismatics who threatened
to unravel the fabric of true religion and civilized society.114 The
means for providing such protection was through civil enforcement of
uniformity in religious doctrine and practice.2 5 By the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, however, the original intention to per-
petuate state-imposed religious uniformity had been widely frustrated
by the efforts of such advocates for religious freedom as Roger Wil-
liams and William Penn, as well as by various circumstances in colo-
nial America that made it impractical to continue religious
persecution.2 16 Colonies with religious establishments became increas-
ingly tolerant of dissenting sects. The road from religious uniformity
to toleration to full religious freedom began with the recognition of
individual rights of conscience; that is, dissenters could practice their
own religion freely so long as they did not breach the peace or inter-
fere with the religious exercises of others. By the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, it was commonly believed that the free exercise of religion could
coexist with religious establishments, and those establishments more
frequently were justified on the ground that religion produced effects
beneficial to state and society.12 7
Despite increased toleration, states with established churches con-
tinued efforts to protect against theological error and the decline of
religious fervor through such coercive measures as religious qualifica-
tions for officeholders, mandatory public worship, and tax support
for the clergy. 28 These laws were widely assailed as being both ineffec-
tive and contrary to the spirit of true religion. Thomas Jefferson
wrote in his Notes on the State of Virginia that the state will only
make matters worse by compelling a person professing error to con-
fess the correct belief: "Constraint may make him worse by making
him a hypocrite, but it will never make him a truer man. It may fix
224. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIuIOus LIBERTY IN AMERICA 67-73 (1902); Sid-
ney Mead, From Coercion to Persuasion: Another Look at the Rise of Religious Liberty and the
Emergence of Denominationalisin, 57 CHURCH HISTORY 68, 68-71 (Centennial Issue 1988).
225. It was generally believed that the church's power to expel or otherwise sanction a dis-
senting or wayward member was inadequate to ensure religious faithfulness. Calvin wrote that
"the Church has no power of the sword to punish or to coerce, no authority to compel, no
prisons, fines, or other punishments, like those inflicted by the civil magistrate." 2 JOHN CAL-
VIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 398 (Fifth American ed. 1819) (1536). It was pre-
cisely because the civil magistrate had the power to compel that Calvin advocated an alliance
between church and state.
226. These circumstances are described in CURRY, supra note 42, at 19-28, 78-104, and
Mead, supra note 224, at 71-78.
227. See CURRY, supra note 42, at 165.
228. The principal features of religious establishments during the founding period were coer-
cive in nature. See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 937 (1986).
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him obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. ' 229 The preamble
to Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom declares that
attempts to influence religious conscience "by temporal punishments
or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness," and are contrary to the plan of God who
"chose not to propagate [religion] by coercions" but rather "to ex-
tend it by its influence on reason alone."230 James Madison urged that
"[w]hilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and
to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us." 2 31 The abuse of this
freedom, Madison warned, "is an offence against God, not against
man. ' 2 2 Baptist minister John Leland maintained that religious estab-
lishments "hold[] forth a tempting bait to men to embrace that relig-
ion which is pampered by the law, without searching after truth
conscientiously.' '233
Objections to religious establishments went beyond their coercive
effects, however. Proponents of religious liberty argued that civil gov-
ernment invaded divine prerogative when it treated one religious
group's doctrines or modes of worship as superior to the rest, thus
"mak[ing] the majority of the people the test of orthodoxy. ' 234 In
their view, the nature of religious belief rendered civil government in-
competent to direct the religious choices of its citizens not only by
229. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERv 17, 159 (1784), reprinted
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 80.
230. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (June 12, 1779), re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSIrITnON, supra note 180, at 77 (original spelling). A modified
version was enacted into law in 1785. Id. at 84. Similarly, the Virginia Declaration of Rights
protected free exercise of religion on the ground "[tihat religion, or the duty which we owe to
our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence." VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in
id. at 70.
231. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 4
(June 20, 1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 82. The Court
has relied on the Memorial and Remonstrance for insight into the founders' intent for the Relig-
ion Clauses. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947). Justice Rutledge called
it Madison's "complete, though not his only, interpretation of religious liberty." Id. (Rutledge,
J., dissenting).
232. MADISON, supra note 231, 4 (original spelling).
233. John Leland, A Blow at the Root: Being a Fashionable Fast-Day Sermon, in THE WRIT-
INGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 233, 251 (L.F. Greene ed., 1845).
234. ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), reprinted in
POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 329, 343 (Ellis Sandoz ed.,
1991) Ihereinafter POLITICAL SERMONS]; see id. at 339 ("God always claimed it as his sole prerog-
ative to determine by his own laws, what his worship shall be, who shall minister in it, and how
they shall be supported").
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coercing participation in religious exercise, but also by determining
the content of true religion.3" "[I]f religion is, at all times and places,
a matter between God and individuals, and also, that religious opi-
nions are not objects of civil government, nor under its control," Le-
land argued, "it then follows that government has no right to describe
the god which the people are to worship." 23 6 Jefferson believed that
religious liberty was necessary because "legislators and rulers, . . . be-
ing themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed domin-
ion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes
of thinking, as the only true and infallible, and as such, [have] en-
deavor[ed] to impose them on others. 237 By the end of the eighteenth
century, a broad consensus about church and state had emerged that
went beyond mere toleration of dissenting beliefs. Thomas Curry, au-
thor of one of the leading histories of church-state relations in colo-
nial and revolutionary America, says that "Americans could not
achieve unity on any one religious belief, but they agreed that the gov-
ernment could have no authority in defining or imposing a belief on
the populace, and that each person was entitled to the free exercise of
his or her religion of choice. 2 8 This consensus was reflected in the
protections for religious liberty enacted at both the federal and state
level.
If any metaphor captures the quintessence and symmetry of the Re-
ligion Clauses, it is not Jefferson's misunderstood "wall of separa-
235. John Locke greatly influenced American conceptions of religious liberty, especially Jef-
ferson's. Locke emphasized that civil magistrates were not given power over individual religious
decisions. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke wrote:
[T]he care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate ... because it appears not
that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel any
one to his religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent
of the people, because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as
blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to
him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform
his faith to the dictates of another.
LOCKE, supra note 206, at 52. Madison argued that since religion is beyond the jurisdiction of
the state, the civil magistrate is not competent to judge religious truth. See MADISON, supra note
231, 1, 2, 5.
236. Leland, supra note 233, at 249. See JOHN LELAND, TIHE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALtEN-
ABLE, AND THEREFORE, RELIGIOUS OPINIONS NOT COGNIZABLE BY LAW; OR, THE HIGH-FLYING
CHURCHMAN, STRIPPED OF His LEGAL ROnE, APPEARS A YAHO (1791), reprinted in THE WRITINGS
OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 233, at 184 ("The duty of magistrates is not to
judge the divinity or tendency of doctrines .... ").
237. JEFFERSON, supra note 230, at 77. See Leland, supra note 233, at 251 (mixing religious
laws and test oaths with civil laws "makes the opinions of fallible men, the test of orthodoxy for
all the people ... and shall the judgment of one man in a thousand, be the rule for the faith and
worship of the whole thousand?").
238. Thomas J. Curry, Church and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century America, 7
J.L. & RELIGION 261, 272 (1989) (emphasis added).
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tion," but rather Roger Williams' imaginary "ship at sea," which he
called "a picture of a commonwealth or society":
It hath fallen out sometimes, that both papists and protestants, Jews
and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I
affirm, that all the liberty of conscience, that ever I pleaded for,
turns upon these two hinges-that none of the papists, protestants,
Jews, or Turks, be forced to come to the ship's prayers of worship,
nor compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they
practice any.239
Thus, in Williams' view, the state interferes with religious freedom in
two ways: first, when it compels people to adopt its religious prac-
tices; and second, when it compels people to abandon their own relig-
ious practices. The enacting clause in Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom is similar. On one hand, it prohibits anyone from
"be[ing] compelled to frequent or support any relig[i]ous Worship
place or Ministry whatsoever"; on the other, it provides that no one
"shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions
or belief. '" 24° The Establishment and Free Exercise clauses also reflect
this complement. The former forbids the state from imposing its pre-
ferred religion, while the latter forbids the state from interfering with
an individual's preferred religion.24t The Establishment Clause pro-
tects all, the religious and nonreligious alike, from the state's efforts
to conform them to officially-approved religious belief or practice.
The Free Exercise Clause protects religious believers from undue inter-
ference by the state with their own spiritual obligations or decisions.
Both clauses are thus necessary to fully protect individual conscience
in religious matters.
B. The Founders' Views on Government Religious Speech
The enactment of federal and state prohibitions on religious estab-
lishments had little effect on the frequency with which government
239. Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1655), in 5 Tm FoUrN-
DERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 50.
240. JEFFERSON, supra note 230, at 77.
241. See Paulsen, supra note 190, at 843 n. 171 ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects the free
exercise of religion ('you can't stop me') and the Establishment Clause protects the free non-
exercise of religion ('you can't make me')."). See generally Giannella, supra note 64, at 516-18;
Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under
the First Amendment, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 805, 810-11 (1978); Michael W. McConnell, Accom-
modation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Go. WASH. L. REV. 685,
686, 690 (1992); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 720, 727-28 (1968).
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conveyed religious ideas or sentiments in its constitutions, laws, pro-
clamations, ceremonies, and symbols during the colonial and found-
ing periods.2 42 Both Congress and state legislatures regularly
proclaimed official days of public fasting and prayer, provided for
chaplains to open their sessions with prayer, and encouraged the prac-
tice of religion in other official pronouncements or enactments.
Speeches by Presidents and other public officials often contained re-
ligious appeals. Official documents such as the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and most state constitutions were replete with references to
God and religion. While Americans agreed that government should
not coerce or otherwise impose religious beliefs or practices, most also
agreed that there should be official recognition of the providential
hand of God in national affairs and encouragement of religious values
they shared in common. The question, then, is whether the founders,
by engaging in or approving of such practices, acted inconsistently
with their intent regarding disestablishment, or whether such actions
reflected that intent.
To answer that question we must get beyond the existence of these
practices and identify, to the extent possible, those principles the
founding generation used to distinguish impermissible religious ex-
pressions from otherwise permissible recognition of religion by gov-
ernment. On one hand, since the founders cannot be expected to have
come to grips with every implication of their commitment to disestab-
lishment, these principles are best identified in the resolution of con-
troversial matters, when the founders had to think through the
establishment issue.2 43 Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger wrote in Marsh
v. Chambers,2"4 "evidence of opposition . . . infuses [the historical ar-
242. Compilation of various forms of official religious expression during the founding pe-
riod can be found in CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 76-
91, 182-83 (1964), EDWARD FRANK HUMPHREY, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 1774-
1789, at 407-39, 487-502 (1924), B. F. MORRIS, CHRISTIAN LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE CWIL
INSTIrUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 206-331, 525-612 (1864), and I ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 447-517 (1950). Several judicial opinions also have recited
many of these practices. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679-80 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671-72 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100-03 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-78 (1984); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983); Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437,
445-46 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827
F.2d 120, 132-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
243. This point is developed in two thoughtful articles by Professor Douglas Laycock on
original intent and the Religion Clauses. See Douglas Laycock, Original Intent and the Constitu-
tion Today, in THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 87, 89-90 (James E.
Wood, Jr. ed., 1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Original Intent]; Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and
the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pun. POL'y 683, 688-91 (1990).
244. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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gument] with power by demonstrating that the subject was considered
carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tra-
dition and without regard to the problems posed by a pluralistic soci-
ety." 145 Unexamined practices, by contrast, may have continued
simply because of precedent, oversight, or failure of anyone to object.
On the other hand, we must not treat the founders as unable to com-
prehend what they meant by the Establishment Clause or, worse, as
deliberately ignoring it in their own proceedings. It is entirely possible
that certain practices continued because of widespread agreement that
those practices posed no establishment problems. 
2
1. Was the Matter Considered?
Colonial charters and constitutions in the seventeenth and early
eighteenth century frequently contained explicitly religious lan-
guage. 247 While such expressions often were manifestations of formal
or de facto religious establishments, almost no one thought religion
was established merely by official documents or pronouncements con-
taining religious content. Consider, for example, the position taken by
Elisha Williams, a Congregationalist minister and former president of
Yale, in the most principled and persuasive defense of religious liberty
in the first half of the eighteenth century. Williams maintained that
the civil magistrate has "no power to establish any religion (i.e. any
professions of faith, modes of worship, or church government) of a
human form and composition, as a [binding] rule." 24 It was not an
establishment of religion, however, for government to speak favora-
bly of religion.
245. Id. at 791.
246. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The
existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a practice. .. [while] not conclusive of its
constitutionality is a fact of considerable import in the interpretation [of the Establishment
Clause].").
247. The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, for example, adopted in 1638-39, attributed
the presence of the first settlers in Connecticut to "Alimighty God," and acknowledged that
"the word of God requires that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such a people there should
be an orderly and decent Gouerment established according to God." FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF
CONNECTICUT (1638-39), reprinted in 1 TrE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSrITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERrroIEs, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 519 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) (origi-
nal spelling). The preface to Pennsylvania's Frame of Government of 1682 begins with the de-
scription of man's creation, fall, and the institution of the rule of law, and then quotes several
verses from the writings of the Apostle Paul that illuminate the purpose of law and human
government. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1682), reprinted in 5 id. at 3052-53 (the
quotations are from Galatians 3:19, 1 Timothy 1:9-10, and Romans 13:1-5).
248. EIjsHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744), re-
printed in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 234, at 72.
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[11f by the word establish be meant only an approbation of certain
articles of faith and modes of worship, of government, or
recommendation of them to their subjects; I am not arguing against
it. But to carry the notion of a religious establishment so far as to
make it a rule binding to the subjects, or on any penalties
whatsoever, seems ... to break in upon the sacred rights of
conscience .... 49
The progress from religious tolerance to full religious liberty by the
end of the eighteenth century had little effect on religious references in
official speech. To some commentators, the content and frequency of
these allusions seem out of step with heightened efforts during the
founding period to undo the remaining state establishments. "[W]hile
adhering to the principle that government had no power in religion,"
writes Thomas Curry, "[Americans] seemed to be saying that in prac-
tice and for the good of society, government needed to promote relig-
ious symbols and values."150 Curry's explanation for what he sees as a
contradiction between the founders' theory and practice is that the
American view of church-state relations emerged largely in response
to controversy rather than to clear thinking; that is, Americans devel-
oped strong ideas about religious liberty, but only applied them when
the diversity of religious groups made it necessary or when dissenters
could persuade them to do so.2 ' Where Americans disagreed about
the meaning of religious freedom, such as over whether government
should provide financial support for the clergy, they decided that gov-
ernment should have no power over religious matters.2 12 However, be-
cause Protestant Christianity and American culture were so
intertwined, Curry argues, few objected to government speaking out
in support of common religious symbols and values, and hardly any-
one stopped to think how this might impose a particular religious
viewpoint. " Disputes over practices such as chaplains and designation
of days of prayer arose only later with a more religiously diverse soci-
ety. 254 Professor Laycock similarly maintains that "the founders saw
no problem with government sponsorship and endorsement of generic
Protestantism . . .because in their society, no one complained ... [i]t
249. Id. at 73.
250. Curry, supra note 239, at 263.
251. Id. at 263, 272.
252. Id. at 272.
253. CuRRy, supra note 42, at 2181.
254. Id. at 219.
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did no apparent harm, no one raised the issue, and they had no occa-
sion to seriously think about it.'1 255
To be sure, practices such as chaplains and days of prayer did not
arouse controversy comparable to that generated by tax support for
churches. Nevertheless, contemporary opposition to these practices
did arise, which forced the founders to ponder whether such forms of
official expression were permissible. The Continental Congress' first
act during its first session in 1774 was to arrange for its daily proceed-
ings to begin with prayer. John Adams described what transpired in a
letter to his wife:
When the Congress first met, Mr. Cushing made a motion that it
should be opened with prayer. It was opposed by Mr. Jay of New
York, and Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina, because we were so
divided in religious sentiments; some Episcopalians, some Quakers,
some Anabaptists, some Presbyterians, and some Congregationalists,
that we could not join in the same act of worship. Mr. Samuel
Adams arose and said, "he was no bigot, and could hear a prayer
from a gentleman of piety and virtue, who was at the same time a
friend to his country. He was a stranger in Philadelphia, but had
heard that Mr. Duchd (Dushay they pronounce it,) deserved that
character, and therefore he moved that Mr. Duch6, an episcopal
clergyman, might be desired to read prayers to the Congress, to-
morrow morning." The motion was seconded and passed in the
affirmative . 256
The objection raised by Jay and Rutledge was that the divergent relig-
ious beliefs of the delegates would make it impossible for all to partic-
ipate in the prayers. Given the extent of religious diversity in America
today, the rather narrow range of religious differences in the late
eighteenth century seems fairly insignificant. Having fewer religious
traditions, however, did not make the differences that did exist any
less real or intensely felt. This exchange suggests the delegates did not
consider nonparticipatory opening prayers to be injurious to anyone's
religious sensibilities or beyond the prerogative of government. Even
if they were unable to "join" in prayer, they could, as Samuel Adams
255. Laycock, Original Intent, supra note 243, at 103. See Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid,
supra note 42, at 917-18 (concluding that widespread objections forced the founders to conclude
that any form of tax support for churches violated religious liberty, but that "other government
supports of Protestantism never aroused enough controversy to trigger similar examination").
256. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Sept. 16, 1784), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 368 n.4 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850-56) (reprint by Books for Librarians Press, 1969)
(internal quotation omitted).
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pointed out, "hear" a prayer offered on their behalf and on behalf of
the nation. 2"7
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 had no chaplains or open-
ing prayers and made no official religious pronouncements. There
were few references to religion in convention proceedings until June
28, 1787, when Benjamin Franklin suggested members of the Conven-
tion turn to prayer as a means of resolving their political differences.
Franklin reminded the delegates that when the Revolutionary War
first broke out, they undertook "daily prayer in this room for the di-
vine protection" and "[t]o that kind providence we owe this happy
opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our
future national felicity. ' 258 He then warned:
[H]ave we now forgotten that powerful friend? or do we imagine
that we no longer need his assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time,
and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth,
that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall
to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can
rise without his aid? ....
... I therefore beg leave to move-that henceforth prayers
imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our
deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning before we
proceed to business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City
be requested to officiate in that service. 59
After the motion was seconded, some delegates observed that while
such a resolution would have been proper at the beginning of the con-
vention, it might now provoke public criticism by suggesting there was
257. Duche continued as chaplain of Congress until his resignation on October 17, 1776, at
which time he was paid a stipend of $150. HI'umHREY, supra note 242, at 412-13. Other chap-
lains were appointed and served until the termination of the Continental Congress. Their duties
generally consisted of opening sessions with prayers, conducting services for the dead, delivering
sermons on days of fasting, prayer, and thanksgiving, assisting in patriotic celebrations, and
supervising the preparation and publication of an American Bible. Id. at 415. Several state legis-
latures and conventions regularly used chaplains to open their sessions with prayer, including
two states that were most instrumental in defining religious liberty. See ANTIEAU, supra note
242, at 76-77. Virginia followed the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer, even
after disestablishment. See J. OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 34 (Nov. 20, 1712); DEBATES AND
OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA OF JUNE 2, 1788 at 13 (1805) (ratification
convention); J. OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA OF JUNE 24,
1788 at 3 (1828) (state legislature). The sessions of Rhode Island's ratification convention, like
Virginia's, began with prayer. WILLIAM R. STAPLES, RHODE ISLAND IN THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, 1765-1790, 668 (Reuben A. Guild ed., 1971) (reprinting the May 26, 1790 convention
minutes).
258. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 451 (Max Farrand ed., revised
ed. 1966).
259. Id. at 451-52 (footnote omitted).
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dissension and disagreement within the convention.2 6 Franklin and
others responded that "the past omission of a duty could not justify a
further omission," that rejection of the motion would mean more
criticism than its adoption, and that any alarm to the country likely
would be as helpful as harmful. 261 One delegate surmised that the real
reason there was no chaplain was because "[tihe Convention had no
funds." 262 No vote was taken on the motion. Franklin noted on the
manuscript containing his remarks that "[t]he Convention, except
three or four persons, thought Prayers unnecessary. " 263 Thus, it ap-
pears Franklin's motion failed for political or pragmatic reasons
rather than out of concern that the prayers would constitute an estab-
lishment of religion.
Objections to opening prayers were raised at the 1787 Pennsylvania
convention debating the ratification of the Federal Constitution. The
practice was opposed on grounds that it was unnecessary, that it
"might be inconsistent with the religious sentiments of some of the
members, as it was impossible to fix upon a clergyman to suit every
man's tenets," and that there was no precedent for it in prior proceed-
ings of the state's General Assembly or constitutional convention. 26
Benjamin Rush, who had offered the proposal, pointed to the practice
of opening prayers in the Continental Congress as precedent, and ex-
pressed hope that "there was liberality sufficient in the meeting to
unite in prayers for the blessings of heaven upon their proceedings,
without considering the sect or persuasion of the minister who offici-
ated." 265 Action on Rush's motion was postponed, and the issue was
never revisited.
When the United States House of Representatives resolved on Sep-
tember 25, 1789 to call for a day of prayer and thanksgiving, it did so
in the face of objections that Congress possessed no power over mat-
ters of religion and that the proclamation might impose upon the peo-
ple something they were not inclined to do-both establishment-type
arguments. The day before, the House had given final approval to the
language of the Religion Clauses. 26 Three days prior to that, the First
260. Id. at 452.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 452 n.15. In a letter to Thomas S. Grimke dated January 6, 1834, Madison indi-
cated that the proposal's introduction at such a late date in the proceedings effectively limited
what could be done, so it was referred to a committee. He speculated that the "Quaker usage"
might explain why the proposal never came to a vote, since the meeting was held in Philadelphia,
as might also the underlying discord among the delegates and the clergy. 3 id. at 531.
264. GeneralAssembly, PA. HERALD, Nov. 24, 1787, at 2.
265. Id.
266. 1 ANNALS OF CONORnSS 913 (Sept. 24, 1789).
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Congress had authorized payment of an annual salary to its chap-
lains.2 61 The resolution introduced by Elias Boudinot requested that
the President "would recommend to the People of the United States a
day of thanksgiving and prayer . . . [for] the many signal favours of
Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peace-
fully to establish a Constitution of government for their safety and
happiness. 268 Thomas Tucker objected on both pragmatic and princi-
pled grounds. He thought the people might not want to give thanks
for the Constitution until they saw that it worked, and he urged that
issuing such a proclamation "is a business with which Congress have
nothing to do; it is a religion matter, and, as such, is proscribed to
us.''269 Boudinot reminded the delegates of similar practices of the
Continental Congress. The resolution was approved. Although delib-
erations on the matter apparently were brief, the nature of Tucker's
objections, while the debates over the Religion Clauses were still fresh
in the minds of all, gave Congress ample pause to consider whether
the proclamation was an impermissible establishment of religion. Yet
no such concerns were voiced. 270
These were not the only instances of opposition to various forms of
official religious expression. John Leland opposed state payment of
chaplains as unnecessary and inconsistent with religious liberty, but he
did not object to chaplains per se.271 When Connecticut enacted a law
in 1791 imposing a fine on all who failed to observe public fast and
thanksgiving days, it prompted objections from Episcopalians whose
liturgical calendar sometimes conflicted such observances.2 72 No one
apparently was prosecuted under the law. Maryland appointed a form
of public prayer for its new government, and clergy of the Church of
England were faced with the choice of using the form, paying a
267. Id. at 2180 (Sept. 22, 1789); 1 Stat. 71. On April 25, 1789, the Senate had elected its
first chaplain, J. oF rTaE SENATE 20, and the House followed suit on May 1, 1789, J. OF THE H.R.
26.
268. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (Sept. 25, 1789).
269. Id. at 915. Tucker believed that any power to issue such proclamations rested with the
states rather than the national government. See id. ("If a day of thanksgiving must take place,
let it be done by the authority of the several States; they know best what reason their constitu-
ents have to be pleased with the establishment of this Constitution.").
270. See generally Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) ("[An act] passed
by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part
in framing that instrument ... is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.").
Curry dismisses Tucker's objections to the thanksgiving proclamation as receiving "scant atten-
tion." Curry, supra note 238, at 269.
271. JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE
LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 233, at 119.
272. ANTIEAU, supra note 242, at 183.
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"treble tax" if they refused, or leaving the state. 273 Most of them de-
cided to leave, and their church buildings were closed or used by other
religious groups. The practices in Connecticut and Maryland of course
were coercive; it is not clear whether they were opposed on other
grounds.
These episodes show that objections were raised and thoughtfully
considered. It is plainly false, then, to suggest that practices such as
appointment of chaplains and designation of days of prayer were
"non-disputed" and "caused no conflict at either the state or federal
level, 2 74 or were the product of "unreflective bigotry." 2 7 The prac-
tices of the founding generation therefore can provide a useful guide
to formulating a more sensitive and workable Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
2. Rationales Supporting Government Religious Speech
Despite the religious diversity in America during the founding pe-
riod, certain theological ideas were accepted by nearly everyone as
true.27 6 This shared frame of reference, or "public theology," was de-
rived mostly from the Bible and was reinforced through widely-pub-
lished sermons. It included faith in an all-knowing and all-powerful
God who created the universe and governs it by his providence, and
who will reward and punish human beings according to whether they
have carried out his will, as well as belief that the human mind can
perceive divine realities, that human beings are at the same time both
noble and brutish, and that the human spirit is immortal. These be-
liefs had profound implications for the new political regime. To eight-
eenth century Americans, life was a unity-they had not yet learned to
separate completely the spiritual from the civil as we are so accus-
tomed to doing in postmodern America. Their daily lives, as well as
world events, were understood within the framework of their religious
beliefs.2 7 7 As one scholar notes: "[I]n eighteenth-century America-in
city, village, and countryside-the idiom of religion penetrated all dis-
273. Coa, supra note 224, at 504.
274. CURRY, supra note 42, at 218-19.
275. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 42, at 919.
276. See, e.g., PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND
POLITCS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 218-20 (1986) (noting that both rationalism and revivalism en-
couraged latitudinarianism by emphasizing broad areas of agreement in Protestant beliefs while
decrying the "nonessentials" stressed by religious formalists); WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION
IN AmERICA 92-93 (3d ed. 1981) (noting the shared assumptions of Christian and Deist theology).
277. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
215-27 (1989) (describing the Puritan "affirmation of ordinary life"). For a description of how
the influence of religion permeated civil and social life, see BONOMI, supra note 276, at 217-22.
19941 1239
1240 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1183
course, underlay all thought, marked all observances, gave meaning to
every public and private crisis. ' 278 The Bible taught them that God
was sovereign over the state as well as the church; as "God's ser-
vant," the civil magistrate was obliged to dispense justice and punish
wrongdoers. 2 9 It was commonly accepted that the nation should seek
divine support and guidance for its political order. The notion of a
thoroughly secular state, completely removed from God's sovereign
authority, was never seriously contemplated .280
Perhaps the most striking recognition of God's sovereignty over the
political order came from James Madison, whose argument for relig-
ious liberty rested primarily on the ground that religion represents ir-
resistible obligations to a higher Being who is beyond the jurisdiction
of the state. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, he explained:
[The right of religious conscience] is unalienable ... because what is
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such
only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent,
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of
Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of
the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any
subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his
duty to the General Authority; much more must every man who
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.""
To Madison, the citizen's prepolitical duty to God, as perceived
within the individual conscience, is superior to political, legal, or so-
cial obligations. Similar recognition of God's sovereignty over politi-
cal society appears in the Declaration of Independence, which asserts
that the "Laws of nature and of Nature's God" stand above the laws
of men. Only because "all Men are created equal" and have been
"endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," do peo-
ple have the right to alter or abolish human government that disre-
gards those rights. 2 2
278. BONOMI, supra note 276, at 3.
279. See Romans 13:1-8.
280. See Smith, supra note 57, at 966-71.
281. Madison, supra note 231, 11.
282. The language of the Declaration is subject to both deistic and evangelical interpreta-
tions. Adams and Emmerich, however, suggest the Declaration was of necessity a consensus
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Official religious speech in the late eighteenth century repeatedly
stressed one dimension of God's sovereignty, namely, his provi-
dence. 211 The belief that God is concerned about and guides the affairs
of both people and nations was shared even by the rationalists of the
day. Consider, for example, the sentiments expressed by Benjamin
Franklin when he called for prayer at the Constitutional Convention.
They reveal that his proposal was not made as a symbolic gesture or
political ploy, but because he really believed that "God governs in the
affairs of men." Other acknowledgments of God's providence are
found in the numerous proclamations issued first by the Continental
Congress and later by both the President and Congress designating
days of public fasting, prayer, and thanksgiving. The first such resolu-
tion, issued June 12, 1775, explains that it is "our indispensable duty
devoutly to acknowledge [the] superintending providence" of the
"great Governor of the World," especially "in times of impending
danger and public calamity. ' ' 28 In 1776, John Witherspoon, the presi-
dent of Princeton, was appointed to chair a committee of Congress to
make recommendations to the states for a day of fasting and
prayer.8 5 He wrote that "it becomes all public bodies, as well as pri-
vate persons, to reverence the Providence of God, and look up to him
as the supreme disposer of all events, and the arbiter of the fate of
nations." 28 6 Similarly, the preamble to what has been called the first
national Thanksgiving Day proclamation,2 7 dated November 1, 1777,
states that "it is the indispensable Duty of all men to adore the super-
intending Providence of Almighty God; to acknowledge with Grati-
document, reflecting a broadly theistic framework due to the fact that the 56 signers represented
6 different denominations, including 34 Anglicans, 13 Congregationalists, 6 Presbyterians, I
Baptist, 1 Quaker, and 1 Roman Catholic. ADAMS & EMEMRICH, supra note 12, at 8; see id.
(arguing that while the theology of the opening paragraph was acceptable to a wide spectrum of
Christians and Deists, the ideas in the closing paragraph reflect Judeo-Christian theology); see
also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 85 (suggesting that the Declaration "may be accepted as
evidence that the founders of the country .. .were sympathetic with the fundamental theistic
belief and with the moral and social teachings of the Gospels"); Robert N. Bellah, Religion and
the Legitimation of the American Republic, 15 Soc'v No. 4, at 19 (1978) (observing that the
Declaration presents "a distinctively biblical God who is much more than a first principle of
nature, who creates individual human beings and endows them with equality and fundamental
rights").
283. For insight into how Americans in the late eighteenth century understood God's provi-
dence over human government, see JACOB CUSHNG, DrVINE JUDGMENTs UPON TYRANTS; AND
COMPASSION TO THE OPPRESSED, reprinted in POLrICAL SERMONS, supra note 234, at 607, 611-12
(sermon on Apr. 20, 1778 commemorating the British attack at Lexington in April 1775).
284. 2 J. OF CONTINENTAL CONG. 81 (June 17, 1775).
285. 1 STOKES, supra note 242, at 300.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 453.
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turde their Obligation to him for Benefits received, and to implore
such farther Blessings as they stand in Need of."'2 8
Between 1775 and 1787, the Continental Congress issued at least
seventeen such proclamations .2 9 Their language is advisory and their
appeal limited. No penalties were imposed for not observing the desig-
nated day in the manner described, and the proclamations were di-
rected to those who were inclined to pray. The closing words of the
first proclamation are typical: "And it is recommended to Christians,
of all denominations, to assemble for public worship, and to abstain
from servile labor and recreation on said day.''29 Their form re-
mained much the same throughout the period. The preamble would
give the reasons for the proclamation, a specific date would be set for
the day of prayer and fasting, and various requests to be offered up to
God would follow. The people would be encouraged to acknowledge
God's overruling providence, confess and turn from their sins and
seek forgiveness, pray for Divine favor and success in their struggles
against England, and seek God's blessing on their leaders, institu-
tions, and community. Allusions to the Bible are frequent, and the
language sometimes is distinctively Trinitarian with references to "Je-
sus Christ" and "the Holy Ghost." Most references to the Deity,
however, are more general, such as "Divine Providence," "our great
Creator," "Supreme Disposer," "Great Governor of the universe,"
"sovereign Lord of heaven and earth," "righteous Governor of the
world," "gracious Benefactor," "Supreme Being," "Divine Re-
deemer," "the Giver of all good," "Supreme Ruler of all human
events," "Almighty Being," and "all-bountiful Creator."
The practice of officially recognizing God's providence over the af-
fairs of the nation continued after the Constitution was ratified. Even
though the Constitution itself is mostly silent about religion,29' John
288. Id. at 452.
289. The proclamations are collected in MoRuus, supra note 242, at 528-43.
290. 2 J. oF CoN-rNENTAL. CONG. 82 (June 12, 1775) (emphasis added).
291. Besides the No Religious Test Oath Clause, there are only incidental references to relig-
ion in the Constitution-the exception of Sundays from days on which the President may exer-
cise his right to veto legislation and the dating of the document as "in the Year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty seven." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, art. VII. Benjamin Rush
later complained in a letter to John Adams that "[m]any pious people wish the name of the
Supreme Being had been introduced somewhere in the new Constitution" and hoped that some
'acknowledgment may be made of his goodness or of his providence" in the proposed amend-
ments before Congress that eventually became the Bill of Rights. Letter from Benjamin Rush to
John Adams (June 15, 1789), in I LETrEMs OF BENamN RUSH 516-17 (L.H. Butterfield ed.,
1951). Rush nevertheless pronounced himself "perfectly satisfied that the Union of the States, in
its form and adoption, is as much the work of a Divine Providence as any of the miracles re-
corded in the Old and New Testament were the effects of a divine power." Letter from Benja-
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Mansfield reminds us that it "embodies a particular view of human
nature, human destiny and the meaning of life. It is not neutral in
regard to these matters. ,292 Nowhere does the Constitution repudiate
the cognizance of God's sovereignty and providence already explicit in
the Declaration of Independence, prayer resolutions, or other forms
of official acknowledgment of religious belief, nor could it. For the
founders to have asserted the supremacy of the state in all matters
would have necessarily denied the existence of a Supreme Being and,
as a consequence, undermined the very assumptions about human na-
ture and human rights upon which the Constitution is based.2 93 Offi-
cial recognition of God's position above the state served as a reminder
that the power of civil government is restrained by higher law. Indeed,
Jefferson worried over how the liberties of the nation would be secure
if removed from "their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of
people that these liberties are the gift of God." 2 94 This is why the lib-
eral constitutional regime that emerged in 1789 did not equate recog-
nition of God's sovereignty and providence in government speech with
an impermissible establishment of religion. Rather, as Robert Bellah
points out, "the reference to a suprapolitical sovereignty, to a God
min Rush to Elias Boudinot (July 9, 1788), in id. at 475. In a similar fashion, James Madison, in
The Federalist No. 37, suggested that the ability of the Constitution's authors to overcome the
seeming insurmountable obstacles they faced was so astonishing that "[it is impossible for the
man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so
frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 37, at 230-31 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
Such omissions tell us little about the founders' intentions regarding government religious
speech. There is no indication that the No Religious Test Oath Clause required the government
to refrain from expressing religious ideas or sentiments, nor is there a logical connection between
the two. Unlike religious speech, test oaths were coercive; they denied certain citizens their civil
rights if they refused to conform to the state-mandated orthodoxy.
292. John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy
of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 856 (1984). See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 213 (1963) ("The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings,
from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.").
293. Professor McConnell has proposed a political version of Pascal's wager:
[WIhile unable to establish a national religion, the liberal state also cannot reject in
principle the possibility that a religion may be true; and if true, religious claims are of
a higher order than anything in statecraft. . . . (R]eligious claims, if true, are prior to
and of greater dignity than the claims of the state. If there is a God, His authority
necessarily transcends the authority of nations; that, in part, is what we mean by
"God." For the state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would be
to deny the possibility that a transcendent authority could exist.
Michael W. McConnell, Accomodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 15.
294. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VmonIA 156 (1861) (Torchbook ed. 1964).
See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 380 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d
ed. 1698) (when civil government becomes tyrannical, the people have, "by a Law antecedent
and paramount to all positive Laws of men," an "Appeal to Heaven").
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who stands above the nation and whose ends are standards by which
to judge the nation and indeed only in terms of which the nation's
existence is justified becomes a permanent part of American political
life ever after." 295
Consider also that the very constitutional provisions now thought to
forbid government from expressing religious sentiments were them-
selves premised, at least in part, on religious considerations. The pre-
vailing justifications for religious liberty during the founding period
were essentially religious. Believing that "Almighty God hath created
the mind free," Jefferson resisted state-imposed religion as "a depar-
ture from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord
both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on
either, as was in his Almighty power to do." 29 Madison's principal
argument for religious freedom in his Memorial and Remonstrance, as
we have seen, was based on the theological proposition that God is
sovereign over both the individual and civil society, and that man's
duty to God is prior in both time and importance to man's duty to the
state.297 To the extent these and other religious defenses for religious
liberty supply the definitive rationales for the Religion Clauses, the
First Amendment itself has religious content. 298 Moreover, the foun-
295. Bellah, supra note 282, at 19. References to God's superintending providence frequently
appear in subsequent official pronouncements. In 1789 President Washington issued a proclama-
tion for a National Thanksgiving, urging that all nations have a duty "to acknowledge the provi-
dence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore
his protection and favor." George Washington, Proclamation: A National Thanksgiving (Oct. 3,
1789), in 1 Richardson, supra note 137, at 64. In his First Inaugural Address, Washington re-
marked that "it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act my fervent suppli-
cations to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who presides in the councils of
nations, and whose providential aids can supply every human defect." George Washington, First
Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), in 1 id. at 52. Prompted by an outbreak of yellow fever,
John Adams issued a proclamation in March 1799, which urged that "a deep sense and a due
acknowledgment of the governing providence of a Supreme Being, and of the accountableness of
men to Him as the searcher of hearts and righteous distributor of rewards and punishments." 9
Tee WoRKs OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 256, at 172. This same idea was behind inclusion of the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954. Senator Ferguson, who sponsored the
measure in the Senate, explained:
I have felt that the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag which stands for the United States
of America should recognize the Creator who we really believe is in control of the
destinies of this great Republic. It is true that under the Constitution no power is
lodged anywhere to establish a religion. This is not an attempt to establish a relig-
ion .... It relates to belief in God, in whom we sincerely repose our trust. . . . We
should at all times recognize God's providence over the lives of our people and over
this great nation.
100 CONG. REc. 6348 (1954). See H.R. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341.
296. JEFFERSON, supra note 230, at 77.
297. See supra text accompanying note 281.
298. See David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76
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ders did not underestimate the importance of religion in shaping and
sustaining the values, habits, and institutions they believed necessary
to support a regime of rights. 299 In their view, religion was special be-
cause it provides citizens with a sense of moral guidance and legiti-
macy not supplied by other institutions, it holds families and
communities together in difficult times, and it teaches people about
the dignity and value of the individual.3°° Disestablishment meant the
federal government could not meddle with private religious decisions,
but it did not prevent official recognition of religion's unique contri-
bution to public life. That is why the Religion Clauses themselves are
a statement about the value of religion to the republic.3 0 The First
Amendment is no more indifferent to the flourishing of religion in
civil society than it is to the flourishing of free speech or a free
press. 02
CORNELL L. REV. 769, 870-71 (1991) (the Religion Clauses may have metaphysical rationales but
endorse no particular religious perspective). I do not mean to suggest that all the framers and
ratifiers of the First Amendment believed in God and his sovereignty over the state as a matter
of personal religious faith, although, at the very least, most would have intellectually accepted
this proposition as true.
299. Thus, John Adams warned that "[olur Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other." Letter from John
Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts
(Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 256, at 228, 229. Madison thought
"belief in a God All Powerful wise & good, is so essential to the moral order of the World & to
the happiness of man, that arguments which enforce it cannot be drawn from too many
sources." Letter from James Madison to Frederick Beasley (Nov. 20, 1825), in 9 THE W1UTrlNS
OF JAMES MADISON 229, 230 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
300. See Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public
Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 316 (1993) ("Religious associations teach people about the infinite
worth of the individual, the obligation to tell the truth, the importance of mutual respect, and
the value of mutual care-all of the values that make other associations and, indeed, democratic
government possible."). Some commentators have suggested that religion undermines liberal de-
mocracy. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommoda-
tion of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75,
172-80 (1990). However incompatible religion may be with some modern versions of democratic
theory, it certainly was not perceived as inconsistent with the constitutional republic established
by the founders. See McConnell, supra note 241, at 738-41.
301. Mark Tushnet and Michael McConnell each have suggested that the Religion Clauses
originated at least in part out of a regard for religion's role in creating and sustaining a commu-
nity where citizens would act for the common good and where morality and self-restraint might
flourish. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrTcAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 274 (1988); Tushnet, supra note 188, at 735-38; McConnell, Accommodation, supra note
293, at 17-18. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2151 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]hose who adopted our Constitu-
tion . . . believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good."). See gener-
ally Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification for Free Exercise, 67 TuL. L.
REV. 87 (1992).
302. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2151 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[The]
Constitution ... itself gives 'religion in general' preferential treatment .... ").
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Remarkably, the founders for the most part do not seem to have
used religious speech solely to legitimate or sanctify a particular politi-
cal order. There is a difference between using religion for supremely
political ends and the political community recognizing its need for di-
vine guidance and protection. The former is characterized by insincer-
ity; the latter, by humility. The official prayer proclamations,
especially those issued in times of national crisis, urge repentance,
supplication, and gratitude-hardly the kind of language that ener-
gizes the pretensions of power. When the founders spoke religiously,
then, it was not to impose religious orthodoxy or to offer some polite
"tip of the hat" to an irrelevant Deity, nor were they merely "em-
ploy[ing] religion as an engine of Civil policy."3 3 They simply were
spelling out what they and the people really believed about the natural
order of things. Recognition of a Supreme Being, although official,
was both general in the abstraction of its terminology, and marginal
in that no one was required to believe in the religious ideas expressed.
If disestablishment reflected the founding generation's commitment to
separating church and state, government religious speech reflected its
belief in the impossibility of separating faith from life.3°4 Controversy
over such expression did not arise, as Curry suggests, with the advent
of a more religiously diverse society. 05 Rather, it coincided with the
arrival of a postmodern culture which has rejected traditional notions
of any transcendent authority that is independent of, prior to, and
more powerful than human experience.3°6
3. The Views of Jefferson and Madison
Judging by their writings, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
both appear to have thought more about the constitutionality of offi-
cial religious expression than most in their generation. They, of
course, have had a unique influence on our understanding of what the
Establishment Clause means.
(a) Thomas Jefferson. The two most important public documents
Thomas Jefferson penned contain distinctively religious language. The
Declaration of Independence contains no less than four references to
303. Madison, supra note 231, at 83.
304. Professor Steven Smith maintains that it is "anachronistic" to think the founders' pub-
lic religiosity was a contradiction between their theory and their practice which became evident
only later, because "it fails to make a distinction that the framers would probably have taken for
granted-the distinction between an institutional separation of church and state and a cultural
separation of government and religion." Smith, supra note 57, at 973 n.99.
305. CuaRY, supra note 42, at 218-19.
306. See generally HUNTER, supra note 50; ROBERT WuTHNow, THE STRuGGLE FOR AMERI-
CA'S SOUL: EVANGELscAts, LsBERAis, AND SECULARISM (1989).
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the Deity. "Nature's God" and "Creator" appear in the first two
paragraphs and "Supreme Judge of the world" and "Divine Provi-
dence" appear in the concluding paragraph.107 His Bill for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom, as previously discussed, rested on explicitly
religious premises. As Judge Easterbrook has observed, "The pream-
ble to the bill is itself an exercise in religious persuasion. "310 These
writings clearly show that Jefferson was not averse per se to religious
references in government speech.
Jefferson also proposed a religious symbol for our national seal.
The same day the Declaration of Independence was adopted, the Con-
tinental Congress appointed Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John
Adams as a committee to prepare a seal for the United States.? 9
Franklin suggested a picture of Moses dividing the Red Sea while
Pharaoh was consumed by the waters, with the motto "Rebellion to
tyrants is obedience to God." Jefferson wanted Israel in the wilder-
ness "led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night." Ironically,
Adams, the most serious Protestant of the three, proposed Hercules
ascending the mountain of Virtue. The committee recommended Jef-
ferson's idea for one side and an elaborate design for the other show-
ing, among other things, the eye of Providence in a radiant triangle
and the motto E Pluribus Unum.310 These were the only two features
from the initial proposal that were preserved in the final design
adopted by Congress in 1782. The report of the secretary, also ap-
proved by Congress, noted: "Reverse. The pyramid signifies Strength
and Duration: The Eye over it & the Motto allude to the many signal
interpositions of providence in favour of the American cause. '
31 1
Stokes suggests that "[t]he story of the seal is interesting as corrobo-
rating the manifold evidence that the founders of the nation were be-
lievers in the guidance of God and wished to give expression to this
faith.' '312
307. Tim DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2, 31 (U.S. 1776).
308. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 135 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eas-
terbrook, J., dissenting). For a helpful discussion of the religious premises and values underlying
this and other Jeffersonian legislation, see Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills
Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jefferso-
nian Model of Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REv. 159, 193-99 (1990).
309. See 1 STOKES, supra note 242, at 467-68 (citing GALLIARW HUTr, HISTORY OF THE SEAL
OF THE UNITED STATES 8-12 (1909)).
310. See id. at 468 for a description of the proposed seal. Stokes observes that the motto has
no particular significance (although it was used by Augustine in his Confessions), "but it is
extraordinarily appropriate as applying not only to the national unity of the different states, but
to the similar spiritual unity of their inhabitants-partly achieved and partly sought-in spite of
differences of race, status, and religion." Id.
311. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
312. Id. (emphasis added).
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Jefferson participated in issuing at least two proclamations for days
of public prayer while holding office in Virginia and apparently en-
dorsed an attempt to have the practice written into law. The first was
a proclamation appointing a "day of fasting, humiliation, and
prayer" issued by the colonial legislature in May 1744.313 Jefferson, as
a member of the House of Burgesses, helped draft and enact the reso-
lution. He later described his role in the effort to include consulting
old Puritan documents as a guide for the wording of the resolution.3
Later, as governor of Virginia, Jefferson issued a proclamation ap-
pointing a day "of publick and solemn thanksgiving and prayer to
Almighty God." 315 In October 1785, James Madison introduced a Bill
for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving (Bill No. 85)
in the Virginia Assembly, but it failed to be enacted into law.116 The
bill apparently was endorsed and perhaps even drafted by Jefferson., 7
Not only did the bill authorize the appointment of days of thanksgiv-
ing and fasting and notification of the public by proclamation, but it
required the clergy to hold services and preach sermons suited to the
occasion or pay a fine of fifty pounds.
When he became President, Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving
proclamations, in part because he believed they violated the Establish-
ment Clause. In a letter to Revered Samuel Miller in January 1808,
Jefferson explained why he chose to depart from the practice of his
predecessors. First, he considered such proclamations as inherently
coercive.
But it is only proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe a day
of fasting & prayer .... It must be meant too that this
recommendation is to carry some authority, and to be sanctioned by
some penalty on those who disregard it; not indeed of fine and
313. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 105 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
314. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMA3 JEFFERSON 8-9 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
315. 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 313, at 177-79 (the proclamation is
dated November 11, 1779, which is after Jefferson had written the Bil for Establishing Religious
Freedom).
316. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF REVISORS APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIR-
oINIA IN MDCCLXXVI 59-60 (Richmond 1784). The bill is reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 313, at 556. See CORD, supra note 42, at 219-20; Dreisbach,
supra note 308, at 193-99.
317. Julian P. Boyd, a leading authority on the general revision of the laws of Virginia dur-
ing this period, reports that a surviving manuscript copy of Bill No. 85 contains a notation in the
"clerk's hand" that the bill was "endorsed by TJ." 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 313, at 556. Several commentators identify Jefferson as the drafter of this bill. See CORD,
supra note 42, at 220-21; ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIOION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 135
(1962); Dreisbach, supra note 308, at 193.
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imprisonment, but of some degree of proscription perhaps in public
opinion. And does the change in the nature of the penalty make the
recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it is
directed?311
Second, Jefferson believed that he had no authority to tell people
when and how they must perform religious exercises. The federal gov-
ernment was "interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling
with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises"
both under the Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment. 119 It
would not be beneficial to religion for the federal government to "di-
rect" or "effect[] any uniformity of time or matter" among religious
groups regarding acts of religious discipline such as fasting and
prayer. 20 "Every religious society has a right to determine for itself
the times for these exercises, [and] the objects proper for them, ac-
cording to their own particular tenets; and this right can never be
safer than in their own hands, where the constitution has deposited
it. "321 Jefferson did not rule out the possibility that such proclama-
tions could properly issue from state executives, but "what might be a
right in a state government, was a violation of that right when as-
sumed by [the federal government].'"32
Jefferson did express religious sentiments and supplications in other
public pronouncements, however. In his First Inaugural Address in
1801, he observed that religion inculcated "honesty, truth, temper-
ance, gratitude, and the love of man; acknowledging and adoring an
318. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 THE FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 98-99 [hereinafter Letter to Rev. Miller] (emphasis in original).
319. Id. at 98.
320. Id. at 99.
321. Id.
322. Id. Jefferson recognized that "power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume
authority in religious discipline ... rest[s] with the states, as far as it can be in any human
authority." Id. at 98. In his Second Inaugural Address in 1805, Jefferson remarked:
In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is placed by the Constitu-
tion independent of the power of the General [federal] Government. I have therefore
undertaken on no occasion to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it, but have left
them, as the Constitution found them, under the direction and discipline of the state
or church authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.
Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRrr-
IN S OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 314, at 341. Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association in 1802, which contains the well-known "wall of separation" metaphor, also was
written at least in part to explain why he did not proclaim fastings and thanksgivings. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 314, at 332; Letter of
Thomas Jefferson to Attorney General Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), in 10 THE WRIINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 305 (Monticello ed.).
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overuling Pro-vidence" and called upon the "Infinite Power which
rules the destinies of the universe [to] lead our councils to what is
best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and prosper-
ity."3 23 He invoked the familiar imagery of Israel's journey to Canaan
from the Old Testament in his Second Inaugural Address and asked
the people "to join with me, in supplications that [God] will so en-
lighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper
their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result in your good, and
shall secure to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of all
nations."324 This, of course, seems puzzling in light of his refusal to
make similar requests in proclamations for days of prayer and thanks-
giving.
Jefferson's concern for federalism only partly explains why he felt
constrained as President to issue religious proclamations even though
he had engaged in the practice when he held office in Virginia. His
letter to Reverend Miller indicates that he had come to view such pro-
clamations as coercive in nature due to social pressures to conform to
the recommended practice. This led him to conclude that their issu-
ance was tantamount to the government "directing" religious exer-
cises.3 21 It is conceivable that Jefferson may have found certain forms
of government religious speech nonobjectionable, so long as that
speech did not coerce anyone, directly or indirectly, to participate in
religious activities. 326 Perhaps this explains why his Second Inaugural
323. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 322, at 317, 320, 323.
324. Id. at 375, 383.
325. Justice Souter rejects this characterization in his Lee v. Weisman concurrence. 112 S.
Ct. 2649, 2674-75 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). He suggests Jefferson's remarks to Reverand
Miller show that Jefferson understood the Establishment Clause to forbid state endorsement,
not just coercion, of religious observance. The proclamations were noncoercive, Souter main-
tains, because they merely recommended a religious observance and the "proscription" to which
Jefferson referred came from private pressures to conform rather than from state action. Id. at
2674 n.5. Nevertheless, he concludes that because such proclamations "demean[ed] religious dis-
senters 'in public opinion,' Jefferson necessarily condemned what, in modern terms, we call
official endorsemem of religion." Id. at 2674. This analysis is flawed, however. Jefferson was
responding to the suggestion that the recommendatory nature of the proclamations precluded
any direct exercise of governmental power over religious exercises. His point was that such pro-
clamations were indeed coercive, if only indirectly due to the social pressures to conform.
Whether Jefferson was right, of course, is besides the point; what matters is that he believed the
proclamations were coercive, and that is one reason why he opposed them. Even if Justice Sou-
ter's reading of Jefferson is correct, it may prove too much. Jefferson's reasoning is remarkably
similar to the majority's in Weisman, who concluded that peer pressure to participate in gradua-
tion prayer made the exercise coercive. See id. at 2659 ("[Gjovernment may no more use social
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means").
326. See David Little, Religion and Civil Virtue in America: Jefferson's Statute Reconsid-
ered, in THE VIRGIN A STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSLY
Address was replete with religious imagery and even contained a re-
quest that his listeners join him in praying for the nation.
(b) James Madison. James Madison, principal author of the Bill of
Rights, served on the chaplaincy committee in the First Congress and
voted for the bill authorizing remuneration for chaplains, but changed
his mind toward the end of his life about the constitutionality of chap-
laincies. In his Detached Memoranda,"7 Madison expressed the view
that chaplaincies were "a palpable violation of equal rights, as well as
of Constitutional principles. "31h He explained that the beliefs of chap-
lains elected by the majority "shut the door of worship" to those in
Congress who are members of minority sects such as Catholics and
Quakers. Since religion is a voluntary activity, he argued, public offi-
cials should discharge their religious duties just like their constitu-
ents-at their own expense. He also thought the practice was
ineffectual, since "the daily devotions conducted by these legal Eccle-
siastics, [are] already degenerating into a scanty attendance, and a
tiresome formality."3 29 Later, in a letter to Edward Livingston dated
July 10, 1822, Madison insisted that "it was not with my approbation,
that the deviation from [the immunity of religion to civil jurisdiction]
took place in Cong[ress], when they appointed Chaplains, to be paid
from the Nat[ional] Treasury."3 0 He acknowledged, however, that
"[a]s the precedent is not likely to be rescinded, the best that can now
AMERICAN HISTORY 237, 240-41 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988) [hereinaf-
ter THE VIRGINIA STATUTE] (noting that up to a point, Jefferson believed in "some voluntary
version of an American civil religion" and envisioned "a certain kind of religious foundation for
civil unity and virtue in the new American republic," even though he had not developed a thor-
oughly consistent approach to the question). See also CARTER, supra note 74, at 117 ("[I]t is
likely that at the time of the Founding, Jefferson shared the general view that government sup-
port for religion was not in itself an evil, but that the state had to be prevented from exercising
coercive authority over the religions .... "); Martin E. Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hun-
dred Years Later, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra, at 1, 3-4 (discussing the persuasive-coercive
distinction in Jefferson's thinking).
327. See Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's Detached Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558-62
(3d Ser. 1946); James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADIsoN ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
89-94 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985). Scholars date the Detached Memoranda sometime between
1817 and 1832.
328. Madison, supra note 327, at 92.
329. Id.
330. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 105 [hereinafter Letter to Livingston]. Madison may have been
indulging in a bit of revisionism here, since nothing indicates that he voiced any opposition to
the practice at the time. He was one of six members of a joint committee appointed in 1789 by
the Senate and House that recommended appointment of congressional chaplains. Stokes notes
that "[ilt is significant that of the joint committee of six members which made the chaplaincy
proposals, three, Ellsworth, Madison, and Sherman, were all members of the convention which
framed the Constitution of the United States and may therefore be trusted to have favored noth-
ing that they did not consider Constitutional." I STOKES, supra note 242, at 457.
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be done, may be to apply to the Const[itution] the maxim of the law,
de minimis non curat. ' '331
Unlike Jefferson, Madison issued several proclamations as Presi-
dent for days of fasting and thanksgiving, taking care to see that they
were merely recommendatory and did not favor the doctrines of one
sect over another 32 The first proclamation recommended August 20,
1813, as a "convenient day" for those religious groups "so disposed"
to gather for "the devout purpose of rendering the Sovereign of the
Universe and the Benefactor of mankind the public homage due to his
holy attributes," and to pray, among other things, that God would
"guide their public councils, animate their patriotism, and bestow his
blessing on their arms." '333 On July 23, 1813, Madison appointed a
national day of public humiliation and prayer addressed "to all, who
shall be piously disposed to unite their hearts and voices in addressing,
at one and the same time, their vows and adorations to the great Par-
ent and Sovereign of the Universe.''34 Other proclamations were is-
sued in 1814 and 1815.335
Madison later had misgivings about this practice. "Alth[ough] re-
commendations only," he wrote in his Detached Memoranda, "they
imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust delegated to po-
litical rulers. 336 While he apparently had greater misgivings about
congressional chaplaincies, he nevertheless described executive relig-
ious proclamations as "shoots from the same root. ' 3 7 He believed
that government should interpose itself only in matters where it has
authority to speak with effect-"[aln advisory [Government] is a con-
tradiction in terms"-and that there is no reason to suppose that gov-
ernment officials have been authorized by their constituents to advise
them on religious matters.3"" Presidential proclamations also
"seem[ed] to imply and certainly nourish the erronious idea of a na-
tional religion." 339 Finally, Madison thought it difficult to frame a re-
331. Letter to Livingston, supra note 330, at 105.
332. Madison also had introduced into the Virginia legislature a Bill for Appointing Days of
Public Fasting and Thanksgiving. See supra text accompanying notes 316-17.
333. MoRu~s, supra note 242, at 549.
334. 27 ANNALS OF CONo. 2673 (July 23, 1813). Perry Miller notes that the Federalists de-
nounced Madison's proclamation as a trick designed to inspire public (and perhaps divine) sup-
port for his foreign policy. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 38 (1965).
335. See James Madison, Proclamations (Nov. 16, 1814 and Mar. 4, 1815), in 2 Richardson,
supra note 137, at 543, 545-46.
336. Madison, supra note 327, at 93.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (original spelling).
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ligious proclamation without favoring the predominant sect or
expressing some position regarding the political circumstances which
created the need for the proclamation in the first place. Madison
noted at the conclusion of his Detached Memoranda that it was un-
derstood that he was "disinclined" to issue such proclamations and
that some individuals "supposed ... that [the proclamations] might
originate with more propriety with the Legislative Body." 34 He ex-
plained that he issued religious proclamations because he thought it
"not proper" to refuse a congressional request, but he made sure that
a form [and] language were employed . . . to deaden as much as
possible any claim of political right to enjoin religious observances
by resting these expressly on the voluntary compliance of individuals,
and even by limiting the recommendation to such as wished
simultaneous as well as voluntary performance of a religious act on
the occasion.3,4'
In his 1822 letter to Edward Livingston, Madison suggested that ex-
ecutive proclamations of religious fasts and festivals "deviat[e] from
the strict principle" that religion is immune from civil jurisdiction in-
sofar as they "[speak] the language of injunction, or [lose] sight of
the equality of all religious sects in the eye of the Constitution. ' 342 He
claimed he "found it necessary on more than one occasion to follow
the example of predecessors" 343 and issue such proclamations, sug-
gesting that he might have felt constrained by political pressure to
continue the practice. Of course, Madison could have followed Jeffer-
son's precedent, and he twice took the initiative to veto congressional
legislation that he believed violated the Establishment Clause. 3" He
nevertheless explained that he was "always careful to make the Pro-
clamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; or
rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper
might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their
own faith & forms. 3 45 Only in this sense would he "reserve to the
Gov[ernment] a right to appoint particular days for religious worship
throughout the State, without any penal sanction enforcing the wor-
ship.'"146
340. Id. at 94.
341. Id.
342. Letter to Livingston, supra note 330, at 105.
343. Id.
344. See James Madison, Veto Messages (Feb. 21 and 28, 1811), in THE COMPLETE MADISON
307-08 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
345. Letter to Livingston, supra note 330, at 105.
346. Id.
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Like Jefferson, Madison was most concerned about the preferential
and coercive effect of these proclamations. While Madison did find
fault with recommended days of fasting and prayer in his Detached
Memoranda, this was only after he was far removed from the contro-
versy.147 In both the Livingston letter and the Detached Memoranda,
when looking back on his issuance of four such proclamations as
President, Madison believed their recommendatory nature and general
language preserved the voluntary and egalitarian features essential to
his conception of religious liberty.
C. Summary of the Evidence
The historical record unfortunately does not provide the definitive
answers we might like. Evidence suggests the founders did consider
whether certain forms of government religious speech were inconsis-
tent with Establishment Clause values and concluded that they were
not. The founders did not believe that disestablishment foreclosed the
government from recognizing the providence of God in national af-
fairs or from acknowledging the value of religion to the republic. If
there was any principled distinction in the minds of the founding gen-
eration between permissible expression of religious sentiments and
forbidden establishments of religion, it was that official religious
speech generally did not entail the imposition of religion by the state
so long as it was nonpreferential and noncoercive. This goes to the
heart of Madison's and Jefferson's objections and is generally re-
flected in the form such expressions commonly took during the pe-
riod. Madison and those in the Continental Congress understood how
official prayers or other forms of religious expression could be offen-
sive to individual religious sensibilities. That did not deter the foun-
ders, however, from approving such practices so long as no one was
obligated to believe a certain way or to participate in religious exer-
cises.
IV. A PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS FOR GOVERNMENT
RELIGIOUS SPEECH
A proper constitutional jurisprudence for government religious
speech must begin with the central value of the Religion Clauses,
347. Justice Brennan has observed that the arguments in Madison's Detached Memoranda
were advanced long after ... the adoption of the Establishment Clause. They repre-
sent at most an extreme view of church-state relations, which Madison himself may
have reached only late in life. He certainly expressed no such understanding of Estab-
lishment during the debates on the First Amendment. See I Annals of Cong. 434, 730-
31, 755 (1789). And even if he privately held these views at that time, there is no
evidence that they were shared by others among the Framers and Ratifiers of the Bill
of Rights.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 684 n.5 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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namely, that the right of conscience in religious matters be kept invio-
late. This means that government should refrain as much as possible
from distorting the individual process of reaching and practicing relig-
ious beliefs.148 Properly understood, the Establishment Clause does
not require us to ask whether government religious speech is somehow
advancing or endorsing religion, but whether it is a means of imposing
officially-preferred religious beliefs or practices. This occurs when
government attempts to direct the religious choices of its citizens
through its rhetoric or symbols. Personal decision making in religious
matters must be respected by insisting that official speech not unduly
thrust a particular religious sensibility or broadly acceptable "civil re-
ligion" on anyone. On the other hand, we do not want government
assuming ultimate authority in defining reality, ordering experience,
and making moral judgments--in short, to behave as if it were God.
Our political tradition emphasizes pluralism over sectarianism and
secularism; we are neither a theocracy nor a godless state. That is why
government, as Michael McConnell suggests, "should eschew both re-
ligious favoritism and secular bias in its own participation in the for-
mation of public culture.'' 3 49
It is not always good for religion when government engages in relig-
ious speech. One danger is that religious language or symbols will be
used insincerely to further a particular political agenda or administra-
tion, something Madison called "an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation.'"' ° Even when its efforts are genuine, government
cannot always be counted upon to avoid corrupting the underlying re-
ligious message. The most subtle and perhaps greatest harm comes
from the tendency of government religious speech to trivialize relig-
ious faith. Stephen Carter reminds us that "having lots of public relig-
ion is not the same as taking religion seriously." 35' Religious symbols
are diminished when they cannot be displayed as part of an official
holiday celebration unless they are sufficiently "secularized" by sur-
rounding objects such as a Santa Claus, reindeer, a Christmas tree, or
even a talking wishing well.3"2 Efforts to use all-inclusive religious ter-
minology may produce a watered-down religious message that is of-
fensive to the religious and nonreligious alike. Of course, general
references to God do not have to be theologically feeble, as illustrated
by Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg and second inaugural addresses.
348. McConnell, supra note 51, at 175.
349. Id. at 194.
350. MADIsoN, supra note 231, 5.
351. CARTER, supra note 74, at 44-45.
352. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 596 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
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These messages are remarkably profound but accessible to nearly eve-
ryone. The problem lies not so much with the use of nondenomina-
tional language, but with the tendency of government speakers to lack
the sincerity of their private counterparts as well as the perception that
such official messages are trite or meaningless. For these reasons, re-
ligious believers should not look to the state as a surrogate for their
own efforts to get religious messages into public life. School prayer
and nativity scenes are not the answer to the moral and spiritual prob-
lems that beset our society.
Yet some forms of official religious speech may be desirable, if for
no other reason than to avoid fostering an inordinate faith in govern-
ment or embracing the ideal of the secular state with its tendencies
toward indifference or hostility to religion. The history of the Religion
Clauses dispels any notion that government must act as if God does
not exist, or is forbidden from affirming the special status of religion
in public life. In this way, government may assert the limits of its own
power and prerogative, recognize a transcendent source for human
rights and human dignity, and encourage those institutions and associ-
ations which provide stability and moral guidance for the political
community. Instead of devaluing religious feeling or constraining re-
ligious conscience, government is best served when it encourages a
wide range of individual choices, both religious and secular. This al-
lows each religion to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma."35 3 Official religious expression does
spark political controversy at times. But it is a mistake to assume that
permitting government speech that is sometimes indifferent, some-
times hostile, but never favorable toward religion will significantly re-
duce the potential for divisiveness along religious lines. We cannot
expect to derive a constitutional standard that will eliminate religious
strife in our political life. The law did not create it, and the law can-
not solve it. The best we can hope for is that the law will avoid aggra-
vating religious conflict, while at the same time ensuring that, in the
political sphere, no "side" ultimately wins.
Finding the middle ground constitutionally between sectarianism
and secularism in the context of government speech is not an easy
task. As I have suggested, the approaches the Supreme Court has fa-
vored in recent cases have been less than satisfying. The endorsement
test, straightforwardly applied, forbids too much, while the coercion
test does not reach far enough. Considering the historic ideals of the
Religion Clauses, as well as the unique difficulties posed by govern-
353. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
1994] WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS RELIGIOUSL Y 1257
ment speech, I offer two limiting principles: coercion and orthodoxy.
A. The Coercion Principle
The coercion principle takes aim at the traditional evil of religious
establishments, namely, the imposition of religion through the coer-
cive power of the state. To apply this principle, we must define what
exactly is meant by "coercion." No one would dispute that the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids the state from compelling persons by direct
legal sanction to conform to the religious sentiments it expresses .1 4
But government has many different avenues for enforcing its way
short of direct coercion. With government's ever-growing presence in
almost every aspect of our culture and personal lives, its influence
may be felt in more subtle ways. Government may indirectly oblige
conformity to its religious messages by making nonconformity more
difficult or costly, aside from any threat of legal penalty.3" Expanding
the concept of coercion beyond direct or legal means is a reasonable
and necessary check on the power of the modern regulatory state.3 56
Two elements must be satisfied for governmental action to be con-
sidered directly or indirectly coercive. The first requirement is a threat
354. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (The Establishment Clause
"forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship.").
355. See generally Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Psn.osopHy, SCrENCE, AND METHOD (Sidney
Morgenbesser et. al. eds., 1969); Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words
and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541; Robert A. Holland, Comment, A Theory of Establish-
ment Clause Adjudication: Individualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in
Identifying Threats to Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1595 (1992). Indirect coercion is a
species of "unconstitutional conditions." As Professor McConnell explains,
[i]n its simplest form, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that if an indi-
vidual possesses a right as against the government, the government may not require
waiver of that right as a condition to the receipt of a benefit-even though the person
may have no inherent constitutional right to the benefit.
McConnell, supra note 24, at 443.
356. In Engle v. Vitale Justice Black rejected the idea that the Establishment Clause is vio-
lated only when the government engages in direct legal coercion:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-
observing individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescrib-
ing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.
370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (emphasis added). See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952)
("If in fact coercion were used, if it were established that any one or more teachers were using
their office to persuade or force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly different case
would be presented.")
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of harm, and is based on the premise that mere suggestion cannot co-
erce. The threat of harm is what makes compliance in a real sense
obligatory; it is the means of coercion. Of course, the threat must be
real, not imagined. In the context of government religious speech, this
occurs when the state conveys a religious message and penalizes non-
conformity to that message by direct legal sanction or threat thereof,
or by requiring the forfeiture of some other right, benefit, or privi-
lege. The difficult question is determining what properly constitutes
the indirect coercive threat. In Lee v. Weisman3"' the student could
have avoided participating in prayers offered at her graduation cere-
mony by choosing not to attend. This is a classic example of indirect
coercion. The student was placed on the horns of a dilemma: she ei-
ther must do something that will violate her religious conscience or
miss her graduation.
The approach embraced by the majority in Weisman also suggests
that social pressure to engage in religious activity may give rise to an
Establishment Clause violation if government has created and retains
sufficient control over the setting in which that pressure occurs.
Justice Kennedy wrote that it is "undeniable . . .that the school dis-
trict's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony
places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
Invocation and Benediction." 3" "This pressure," he continued,
"though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compul-
sion.''59 It follows then that "government may no more use social
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means." 3w6
Although agreeing with the result in Weisman, Michael Paulsen has
criticized this approach for confusing private with state action. Pro-
fessor Paulson writes, "[Tlhis analytic error is unqualifiedly danger-
ous in its implication ... that speech by private parties that occurs on
public property or in a state-created forum may be imputed to the
government and, on that basis, regulated or banned. ' '36'
Justice Kennedy's position in Weisman is supported by at least two
early advocates of religious freedom. Thomas Jefferson refused to is-
sue recommendatory Thanksgiving proclamations as President,
largely because he perceived they were "to carry some authority, and
357. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
358. Id. at 2658; see id. at 2659 ("Research in psychology supports the common assumption
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that
the influence is strongest in matters of social convention.").
359. Id. at 2658.
360. Id. at 2659.
361. Paulsen, supra note 190, at 798.
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to be sanctioned by some penalty on those who disregard it; not in-
deed of fine and imprisonment, but of some degree of proscription
perhaps in public opinion."362 John Leland maintained that one of the
evils of religious establishments was that "the minds of men are bi-
ased to embrace that religion which is favored and pampered by law
... while those who cannot stretch their consciences to believe any-
thing and everything in the established creed, are treated with con-
tempt and opprobrious names. ' 363 The school prayer and Bible
reading cases contain similar views. Justice Brennan, for example, rec-
ognized that peer pressure may have prevented children who did not
want to participate in such activities from exercising their right to be
excused:
[B]y requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and
schoolmates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of
nonconformity, the procedure may well deter those children who do
not wish to participate for any reason based upon the dictates of
conscience from exercising an indisputably constitutional right to be
excused. Thus the excusal provision in its operation subjects them to
a cruel dilemma. In consequence, even devout children may well
avoid claiming their right and simply continue to participate in
exercises distasteful to them because of an understandable reluctance
to be stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists simply on the basis of
their request.164
Justice Douglas, who did not consider the challenged exercises com-
pulsory, remarked that "some may think they have that indirect effect
because the nonconformist student may be induced to participate for
fear of being called an 'oddball'. ' 36
Professor Paulsen maintains that a schoolchild's peers are not sub-
ject to the Establishment Clause; whatever pressure they may exert is
private rather than state action. This is an astute observation. Nothing
indicates that Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Brennan, or
even Jefferson considered it. Nevertheless, Paulsen's fear that the ra-
tionale of Weisman will undermine the Supreme Court's cases protect-
ing student religious speech within fora created for student expression
on public university or high school campuses seems largely un-
362. Letter to Rev. Miller, supra note 318, at 99.
363. LE LAND, supra note 236, at 182.
364. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 289-90 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted).
365. Id. at 228 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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founded.36 Weisman involved government speech in a setting where
the government's presence was pervasive. The Court's ruling forbade
official prayer, not the audience's private expressions of disap-
proval. 67 Equal access cases typically involve a state-created forum
where there may be private pressure to conform to private religious
messages. But when the state creates the occasion, controls the pro-
gram, and is the sole or principal religious speaker, it is easier to at-
tribute to the state's coercive process any pressures to conform to that
message which occur in that environment. Outside such a context, so-
cial pressure should not give rise to an Establishment Clause viola-
tion .16
366. See Paulsen, supra note 190, at 834-35. See also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to equal access provision for student relig-
ious club on high school premises); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (rejecting argument
that equal access to university facilities for student religious group violates Establishment
Clause).
367. Social pressure, as Professor Paulsen points out, usually (if not entirely) consists of
speech in the form of disapproving glances or other symbolic expressions as well as actual words.
See Paulsen, supra note 190, at 843.
368. Justice Kennedy devoted the first half of his analysis in Weisman to emphasizing the
extent of government involvement in sponsoring and directing the content of the challenged
prayers. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-57. The school principal, a state official,
had decided that the prayers should be given and had selected the clergyman who would offer
them. The principal also advised the clergyman that his prayers should be nonsectarian and pro-
vided him with written guidelines for their composition. "Through these means," Justice Ken-
nedy concluded, "the principal directed and controlled the content of the prayer." Id. at 2656.
The official's actions, in Kennedy's view, violated a "cornerstone principle" of the Establish-
ment Clause, namely, that "'it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by government."' Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). The state's involve-
ment in controlling the content of the clergyman's prayers is, of course, what makes Weisman a
case of government rather than private religious speech.
Was the state's involvement a separate ground for invalidating the prayers or only a prerequi-
site to finding coercion? Certain language in the majority opinion suggests that government may
not conduct prayers or other formal religious exercises even if they are not coercive. In other
places, however, Justice Kennedy was careful to link the state-directed prayer to its coercive
context. He found the school principal's instructions to the clergyman regarding the appropriate
content of his prayers inherently coercive because "[elven if the only sanction for ignoring the
instructions were that the rabbi would not be invited back, we think no religious representative
who valued his or her continued reputation and effectiveness in the community would incur the
State's displeasure fin this regard." Id. At issue was "an overt religious exercise in a secondary
school environment where . .. subtle coercive pressures exist and where the student had no real
alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation." Id.
Thus, the question was not whether the state could compose a nonsectarian prayer for public
use, but rather "the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all when the object is to
produce a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise which students, for all practical pur-
poses, are obliged to attend." Id. If the Establishment Clause forbids government from conduct-
ing religious exercises regardless of their context, there was no need for Justice Kennedy to
address the problem of coercion once he had concluded that content of the challenged prayers
was attributable to the state. It also would render superfluous Justice Kennedy's efforts to dis-
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This does not mean that a graduation prayer is permissible just be-
cause the prayer is ordered by a majority of the student body rather
than by school officials, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District.69 In Jones the
school district had adopted a policy of allowing students to decide
whether to include an invocation in graduation ceremonies and which
student volunteer would deliver it.137 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
the graduation prayers permitted by the policy
place less psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue
in Lee [v. Weisman] because all students, after having participated in
the decision of whether prayers will be given, are aware that any
prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less able to coerce
participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.3 7'
The result was that "a majority of students can do what the State
acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public high
school graduation ceremonies.372 I disagree. So long as graduation
prayers confront dissenters with the choice of participating in a relig-
ious activity, openly dissenting, or electing to miss their graduation
exercise, it makes little difference whether the prayers are given by
student volunteers or school officials. Participation in such prayers
can hardly be considered voluntary. Rather than reducing the effects
of peer pressure, the school's policy actually sanctions it by allowing a
majority of students to use the machinery of the state to impose their
approved religious exercise on nonadherents . 7
tinguish the legislative prayers in Marsh v. Chambers on the ground that "[tlhe atmosphere at
the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little
comment and for any number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining potential of the
one school event most important for the student to attend." Id. at 2660. Given the "high degree
of [state] control over the precise contents" of the graduation ceremony, "the state-imposed
character of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make the
prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with no alternative but
to submit." Id. All of this suggests that the majority in Weisman found a necessary connection
between government religious speech and attendant social pressures to conform to that speech.
369. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
370. Id. at 964 n.l.
371. Id. at 971.
372. Id. at 972.
373. Jones also held that the school did not endorse religion by allowing student-led gradua-
tion prayers, because 'there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing relig-
ion ... and private speech endorsing religion."' Id. at 969 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)). The court found the school's policy permitting religious or nonreli-
gious invocations, at the discretion of the student majority, similar to the equal access approach
upheld in Mergens. Accord Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F.Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993)
(upholding student-led graduation prayers as protected speech under Mergens). There is a signif-
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The second requirement of the coercive process is an act of compli-
ance, and is based on the premise that belief-especially religious be-
lief-cannot be coerced .37  The object of the coercive threat must be
to force performance of an act that signifies affirmation of religious
belief or participation in religious exercise on one hand, or renuncia-
tion of religious belief on the other. This reflects the harm that occurs
when a person is forced to say or do what his religious conscience will
not allow. It is distinct from such "psychic" harm as feeling offended
or alienated. The coercion principle is violated when government
forces individuals to choose between participating in or protesting a
religious exercise, or forfeiting some right, benefit, or privilege. It is
concerned with actions that signify espousal of religious ideas or prac-
tices rather than with avoiding mere exposure to offensive religious
messages. From the standpoint of protecting individual conscience in
religious matters, this distinction is crucial.3 7
Consider two examples. The first involves a public school gradua-
tion ceremony that begins each year with an invocation during which
the audience is asked to stand, bow their heads, and join the speaker
in prayer ("Let us pray."). A student who objects to the prayer has
icant difference between the two, however. In Mergens there were many student voices; in Jones
only one-the majority's. When a school permits student-led religious clubs to meet along with a
variety of secular student clubs, it is unlikely that students will perceive state endorsement of
religion. The policy approved in Jones, on the other hand, ensured that no minority views would
be heard. The school thus could be perceived as endorsing the majority's view.
This is different from a student expressing her personal religious faith in a valedictory address,
which should not have been held unconstitutional in Guidry v. Calcasieu Parish School Board,
Civil Action No. 87-2122-LC (W.D. La. Feb. 22, 1989), aff'd sub nom. Guidry v. Broussard,
897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990). Her selection as speaker based on her academic performance and
the fact that valedictory addresses are commonly understood to represent the student's own
views would dispel any suggestion that the state is presenting her beliefs its own. See Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 n.8 (f992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("If the State had chosen its
graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a
state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to
attribute an endorsement of religion to the State."). Moreover, if student graduation speakers
may talk about what they consider most important in life, their future goals, and so forth (as
traditionally happens), the state cannot forbid a student from offering religious viewpoints on
such matters. The student religious expression in Jones, however, was not permitted for the
purpose of avoiding discrimination against religious views.
374. Locke maintained that "i]t is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's
opinions; and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other out-
ward penalties." LocKE, supra note 206, at 53. Jefferson similarly recognized that since the
human mind was "insusceptible of restraint," any efforts to coerce it "tend only to beget habits
of hypocrisy and meanness." JEFFERsON, supra note 230 at 77. Madison also believed "the opi-
nions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow
the dictates of other men." MADiSON, supra note 231. 1.
375. This differentiates the coercion analysis from the endorsement test which emphasizes
the offense or stigma created by official religious words or symbols. See supra notes 192-99 and
accompanying text.
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one of three alternatives. She can bow her head while the speaker
prays, but that would make her feel "that she is being forced by the
State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow.1 37 6 She can
decline to participate by refusing to stand or bow her head, which will
openly signal her dissent. Or, finally, she can decide to skip her com-
mencement altogether, since attendance is not mandatory. The partici-
patory nature of the prayer in this setting forces the dissenting student
to choose between doing something her conscience will not permit
(publicly affirming or disavowing religion) or foregoing her gradua-
tion ceremony as the price of nonconformity.
The second example is identical to the first, except instead of asking
those in attendance to stand, bow their heads, or engage in some other
responsive act, the speaker simply prays for the audience and the oc-
casion. The same student now has two alternatives. She can remain
silent during the prayer and listen or she can refuse to attend the
event. Suppose she listens to the prayer. Will that force her to do
something against her conscience? Probably not. Mere exposure to
someone else's religious activity does not create a "conflict of
conscience' '1 77 in the usual sense.178 Suppose she is asked to stand dur-
ing the prayer. While standing ordinarily shows respect, it is not a
religious act and does not necessarily signify either participation or
dissent in this context. 7 9 People generally are not constrained by con-
science from showing respect for the religious beliefs of others. Unless
the student is asked to participate in the prayer, her real complaint is
that the prayer is being said, not that she is being forced to violate her
conscience.
376. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
377. Id. at 2660.
378. See John H. Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 761, 768 (suggesting
that hearing a prayer does not force a person to do something against her will or cause scandal
to others of her faith "because hearing is not an act that communicates meaning to others").
379. Id. at 767 ("[T]he act of standing has an uncertain social meaning. It can signify partic-
ipation; but it can mean something else."). My principal disagreement with the holding in Weis-
man turns on this point. The majority concluded that "the act of standing or remaining silent
was an expression of participation in the Rabbi's prayer . . . given our social conventions, a
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own partici-
pation or approval of it." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. But the Court acknowledged that "in
our culture standing . .. can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the views of
others." Id. As Justice Scalia observed, if it is permissible to infer that one who is standing is
doing so out of respect for the beliefs of others, rather than participating in the exercise, why is
the "reasonable dissenter" tied to the latter and not the former? See id. at 2682 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia goes on to suggest that the government's interest in fostering respect
for religion generally trumps any interest the dissenter might have in avoiding even the false
appearance of participation. Id. To the contrary, if the false appearance of participation creates
a legitimate conflict of religious conscience, the respect for religion mandated by the First
Amendment requires that government cease its coercive activity.
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My point is that without being compelled to do something that af-
firms or denies religious belief, conscience is not coerced. This means
that mere exposure to official religious messages or attendance at sec-
ular public events where nonparticipatory prayers are said, even as a
captive audience, should not suffice as coercion under the Establish-
ment Clause. Forced attendance would be unconstitutional, however,
if attendance itself signifies religious worship, expression, affirmation,
or participation. That is why the state cannot compel persons to fre-
quent worship services at a Baptist church or Jewish synagogue. At-
tending church is a religious activity. It ordinarily signifies
commitment to a particular religious group's doctrines and involves
participation in religious worship. By contrast, merely hearing a
prayer or viewing a religious display is not an inherently religious act.
Some people may respond in a religious manner as a result, but that is
not required in order to listen or observe.13
The analysis I have described would allow prayers to be said at pub-
lic events so long as the form of those prayers is similar to that
adopted by the Continental Congress, where onlookers heard the
prayers, as Samuel Adams suggested, rather than participated in
them. The distinction between "Let me pray for you" and "Let us
pray" is a fine but workable one and is consistent with the values
reflected in the Religion Clauses. Since the principal concern would be
to ensure that the prayer is nonparticipatory rather than theologically
nonoffensive, this approach would permit more authentic spiritual ex-
pression as people from a wide variety of religious backgrounds offer
prayers in accord with their religious traditions. Of course, nonpartici-
patory prayers could still be constitutionally objectionable under the
orthodoxy principle, as discussed below, if they disproportionately
feature the beliefs or representatives of a particular religion or denom-
ination in a way that suggests that group is superior to others. Within
these limitations, prayers offered at official events could foster a sense
380. Thus, I cannot agree with Professor Paulsen's rejection of participation in prayer as a
necessary element of coercion and his defense of the result in Weisman by describing it as a case
of compelled attendance at a religious worship service. See Paulsen, supra note 190, at 828-31.
As Professor Richard Myers points out, Paulsen's entire argument depends on his characteriza-
tion of the graduation exercises in Weisman as a worship service. Richard S. Myers, A Comment
on the Death of Lemon, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 903, 905 (1993). Myers lists several factors
which argue convincingly against the analogy Paulsen attempts to draw between Weisman and
laws requiring compulsory church attendance: "the students were not in a church or other place
of worship, and there was no identifiable congregation in the sense of a worship community; the
purpose of the event was to celebrate the graduation, not to worship; and no institutional rela-
tionship existed between the school and any religious denomination." Id. at 905-06 (parentheti-
cal omitted). Attending church signifies religious activity or commitment. Merely listening to a
prayer at an otherwise secular event carries no inherent religious significance.
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of openness, diversity, and common respect for the beliefs of others,
as Cole Durham discovered while listening to a prayer offered at his
son's graduation ceremony:
[The prayer] started out in English, but the student offering it was a
Chicano, and most of his prayer was in Spanish.... [Als the prayer
went on and the force of what was happening sank in, most of us in
that audience felt something much more profound. While few could
literally understand what was being said, we understood that the
young Chicano was engaging in an exercise of deep personal meaning
at a particularly important moment in his life. We heard, or better,
felt the call of his conscience, emanating from another culture in
another language and another voice, and in that moment of
encounter, something was translated into our own modes of
responding to the experience of conscience, thereby opening a
channel to the highest within each of us. The experience confirmed
us at once in our unity and in our diversity, providing us with a
glimpse of the way that even distinctive assertions of conscience can
have an integrating influence that bridges cultural distance.'"
To be sure, the coercion principle will not forbid situations where
adults or children are forced to hear unwelcome religious messages
from the government. If the standard is that mere exposure to relig-
ious ideas, symbols, or activities is forbidden under the Establishment
Clause, then our public schools must be swept clean of anything that
refers to the existence of a Supreme Being or is supportive of religion,
including the Pledge of Allegiance, National Anthem, and Declaration
of Independence." Courtroom supplications must be halted because
jurors, parties, and attorneys are obligated to be present at the pro-
ceedings. The national motto "In God we trust" must be removed
from our money because people cannot handle it without the risk of
being exposed to its message. Religious symbols cannot be exhibited in
public parks or buildings because people who use those facilities must
view the displays. Serious application of a "no forced exposure" rule
would require secularization of virtually all government speech. 8"
Rather than opting for an absolute approach, the potential for harm
381. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 71, 74 (1992).
382. If this is what the Establishment Clause requires, then Professor Dent is correct when
he asserts that the same standard should apply under the Free Exercise Clause when religious
parents and children object to forced exposure to public school instruction that slights their
religious beliefs. See Dent, supra note 73.
19941 1265
1266 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.21:1183
from official religious messages that require no affirmation or partici-
pation is better handled under the orthodoxy principle. 3
B. The Orthodoxy Principle
James Madison put it best when he said any notion that "the Civil
Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth" is an "arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages,
and throughout the world." 3s4 John Leland echoed these sentiments
when he condemned religious establishments because "[u]ninspired
fallible men make their own opinions tests of orthodoxy, and use their
own systems, as Procrustes used his iron bedstead, to stretch and
measure the consciences of all others by." 85 Thomas Jefferson like-
wise maintained that
to suffer the civil Magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of
opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles
on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at
once destroys all religious liberty; because he ... will make his own
opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the
sentiments of others only as they shall square with, or differ from his
own.
38 6
Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that "It]he law knows
no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma." '387 It fol-
lows then that "government may not ... lend its power to one or the
other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma. '38
383. Profetsor Garvey identifies four types of harm government religious speech might cause
to the individual: (1) forced assent to or renunciation of religious belief; (2) scandal to others of
the individual's religious faith; (3) false belief (religious heresy or simple error); and (4) false
religious practice (idolatry). Garvey, supra note 378, at 762-66. The first two harms ordinarily
occur in settings where a dissenter is forced to participate in religious affirmation or exercise.
The latter two result when an individual is exposed to a religious message and persuaded to
believe or act on it.
384. MADISON, supra note 231, 5.
385. LELAND, supra note 236, at 182.
386. JEFFERSON, supra note 230, at 77.
387. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871).
388. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citations omitted). See Thomas v.
Review Bd.. 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (noting that "[ilntrafaith differences . . . are not un-
common among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped
to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses" and that "it is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence" to determine whether one person or another "more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith," since "[clourts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation"); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976) (noting the danger that "the State will become entangled in essentially religious controver-
sies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs"); United States v.
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These considerations translate into a prohibition on government
speech that conveys a message of religious orthodoxy.
The term "orthodoxy" means right belief, as opposed to heresy or
heterodoxy. It expresses the idea that certain theology, worship, or
ritual accurately embodies the content of true religion and is therefore
normative for all. Since religions differ in their beliefs, practices, and
claims to divine authority, not all of them can be correct. 89 The com-
mitment to religious liberty embraced by the founders rested in part
on the belief that it is not within civil government's jurisdiction or
competence to judge the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. 9° This
means that government cannot suggest, directly or indirectly, that a
particular group's doctrines are less true than others, nor can it de-
clare one religion or group of religions superior to the rest or suggest
that some beliefs are more true than others. The state may not declare
what is theologically correct, that is, it may not direct people's choices
in religious matters by defining what is acceptable religious belief or
behavior. To do so would impose the state's religious views on the
listener in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Forbidding messages of religious orthodoxy solves the problem of
indoctrination or proselytization that falls short of coercion. Indoctri-
nation occurs when the government tells people what they must be-
lieve or practice in religious matters. Proselytization is the persuasive
attempt to convert someone to a particular religious belief which is
held out above all others as being worthy of one's commitment. Both
present certain religious views as more true or acceptable than others.
The orthodoxy principle recognizes that many people obey the direc-
tives of government "for the sake of civility, harmony, and considera-
tion of others,"3 91 rather than out of fear of penalty or anticipation of
reward. It thus forbids the state from engaging in religious imperative
or persuasion, regardless of whether there are attendant pressures to
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (finding that the trier of fact cannot judge whether religious
beliefs are true or false). See also Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that our constitutional tradition forbids "government-sponsored endorsement of religion-even
when no legal coercion is present ... where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specify-
ing details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world, are known to differ").
389. See RICHARD CAVENDISH, THE GREAT RELIGIONS 8 (1980) ("[Tlhe attitudes of the major
religions to salvation and the purpose of life are quite different."); J.N.D. ANDERSON, CHmISrI-
ANITY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION 11 (1970) ("[Elven the most elementary study of the different
religions reveals fundamental contradictions."). This is true not only between religions, but also
within religions. See, e.g., SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIous HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEO-
PLE 571-82 (1972) (describing the characteristically American features of sect formation).
390. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
391. Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437,442 (7th Cir. 1992).
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conform. By contrast, the orthodoxy principle would not bar govern-
ment from merely recommending that people engage in a certain relig-
ious practice if they are so disposed. In this way, no one is asked to do
anything that would violate religious conscience, nor is the state sug-
gesting that it is better to engage in religious exercise than not. Offi-
cial pronouncements that follow the recommendatory form Madison
used in his prayer proclamations should be permitted, so long as no
particular religious position is given such prominence that the message
becomes one of orthodoxy rather than pluralism.
This analysis refines the endorsement concept in several respects.
Orthodoxy is a narrower standard than endorsement, but still retains
the essential idea that government should not favor one religious be-
lief or practice over another. Like the endorsement test, it is context
sensitive. Instead of asking whether government speech sends a mes-
sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, the relevant question is
whether the message promotes a particular religious view in a way that
conveys a clear expectation to the nonadherent that he or she accept
that view. Since the orthodoxy principle is aimed at official pron-
ouncements or symbols that impose religion, the inquiry redirects at-
tention to the content and context of the message, and away from
mere perceptions. If government religious speech violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, it is not because such expression merely is an affront
to individual feelings; rather, it is because the state has invaded the
process of private religious decision making. Real harm occurs when
the purpose or effect of government speech is to distort or otherwise
influence that process, independent of any offense it causes to the lis-
tener. Deciding whether official messages or symbols present one re-
ligious position as more true or acceptable than others involves
determinations that are less prone to subjective manipulation than de-
ciding whether such expression endorses or only acknowledges relig-
ion. 92 This considerably reduces the potential for observer bias
inherent in the endorsement test.
The orthodoxy principle explains why the Establishment Clause al-
lows printing "In God we trust" on our money, but not "In Jesus
Christ we trust" or "Allah be praised." Generalized references in our
national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance to God's position over
the state and the religious nature of our people are consistent with a
host of different religious traditions rather than expressions of a par-
ticular orthodoxy. Although they recognize the existence of a Supreme
Being, these statements are not couched in imperative terms. In other
392. Of course, no legal principle, including those proposed here, is immune from judicial
manipulation.
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words, they do not tell people to believe in God or to embrace a par-
ticular religious doctrine or practice.
Daily Bible reading or recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public
schools would not survive application of the orthodoxy principle be-
cause they present exclusively the beliefs of one religion. However, if
a school began its day by reading to students brief meditations from
various literary or political sources such as Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Shakespeare, the Federalist Papers, or Martin Luther King, Jr., it
would be permissible to include readings from religious sources such
as the Koran or the Bible, so long as those readings are not dispropor-
tionately featured, present one religion as superior to the rest, or urge
students to accept particular religious beliefs. While teachers could
not use their official positions to direct students in what to believe or
practice in religious matters, 39a religious perspectives on controversial
issues could be included in public school curricula or other official
programs, so long as they are presented as part of a variety of view-
points rather than as the correct view." 4
The orthodoxy principle provides a more reliable standard for ana-
lyzing displays of religious symbols on government property, which
usually are both passive and sectarian. The concern here is to ensure
that the symbols of one religion, or group of religions, are not so pre-
ferred or prominently featured as to suggest that the government con-
siders the beliefs those symbols represent to be more true or superior
to the rest. This would explain why the permanent display of a large
Latin cross atop city hall would violate the Establishment Clause,
even though it is not directly or indirectly coercive. The religious
makeup of the relevant political community would provide a suffi-
cient baseline for determining whether some religious symbols are dis-
proportionately displayed. If government officials feature the symbols
of certain religious groups while refusing requests for fair treatment
of alternative symbols within the community, it could be inferred that
those officials are promoting religious orthodoxy.3 9 The better solu-
tion, in my view, would be for government itself to refrain from dis-
playing sectarian religious symbols but vigorously enforce equal access
for private religious speakers to public property that is a traditional or
393. For a helpful discussion of issues related to distinguishing teacher-as-individual from
teacher-as-government in the public school context, see Paulsen, supra note 190, at 849-52.
394. Under the orthodoxy analysis, the inclusion of two books titled The Bible in Pictures
and The Life of Jesus in a fifth-grade teacher's classroom library of over two hundred books
would not have been unconstitutional, since the library also contained works on American In-
dian religions and Greek mythology. The Tenth Circuit took a contrary view in Roberts v. Madi-
gan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1990).
395. McConnell, supra note 51, at 193.
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designated forum for public expression. In any event, the orthodoxy
principle would permit official policies toward the display of religious
symbols that promote a sense of diversity and pluralism, while at the
same time protecting against religious indoctrination or proselytiza-
tion.
There are times when the coercion and orthodoxy principles will
overlap. For example, if a school principal tells everyone at a gradua-
tion ceremony to stand and pray, her religious imperative directs an
"orthodoxy of practice" and the participatory features of the prayer
render it coercive. Nevertheless, because the orthodoxy principle is
more susceptible to intuitive application, the proper starting point is
coercion. When government speaks religiously, we must ask first, "Is
it coercive?" We should then inquire, "Does it convey a message of
orthodoxy?" These limits are both sensible and faithful to the historic
ideals of the Religion Clauses.
V. CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause protects against government-imposed re-
ligion. It does not require a secular public sphere completely devoid of
all reference to God or religion, nor does it permit a religious majority
or minority to use the means of government to impose its religious
views on the rest. Government may speak religiously, but it must
avoid both the rhetoric of orthodoxy and coercing compliance with its
messages. Beyond these fundamental protections, the frequency and
content of official religious speech must be left to the political process
and mutual forbearance. 39
396. On the importance of mutual forbearance and toleration, see Tushnet, supra note 188,
at 735-38.
